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ABSTRACT
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
AND CRACK COCAINE:
A CALL FOR PARSIMONY IN THE FORM 
OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
by
Mr. David J. Hubbard
This is a qualitative study that examines the assertions made by other legal 
scholars that minority based sentencing disparity, as it relates to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, is due to intentional racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination. Professor 
Celesta A. Albonetti (1997) makes the unfounded assertion that minority based 
sentencing disparity, as it relates to the Guidelines, is due to intentional 
discrimination by federal judges and prosecutors. When examining minority based 
sentencing disparity under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, black males are 
incarcerated longer than other minority groups for violations of federal cocaine 
statutes. Black males are also incarcerated longer than nonminority offenders for 
violations of federal cocaine statutes. Minority based sentencing disparity does 
exist, but is not due to intentional discrimination. Minority based sentencing 
disparity is the product of past employment discrimination in the United States and 
legal, structural aspects of federal statues and their interaction with the Guidelines. 
The primary cause for large numbers of black males being incarcerated more often 
and for longer periods of time is due to the fact that certain federal crimes 
committed disproportionately by blacks are punished more severely than crimes 
that are committed disproportionately by white males. Crack cocaine violations are 
committed disproportionately by black males due to discrimination and economic 
deprivation. The false perception of intentional racial and ethnic sentencing 
disparity erroneously attributed to the Guidelines is due to the U.S. Congress and its 
willingness to place more emphasis upon the possession, use, and distribution of 
crack cocaine, the historical existence of deeply rooted racial, ethnic, and economic 
discrimination embedded in American culture, and the failure of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to formulate a sound and well balanced sentencing 
rationale.
This study examines the controversy surrounding the U.S. Congress and the 
negative impact of mandatory minimum sentences on the Guidelines and minority
offenders. The Guidelines transition from legally binding administrative law to 
vague advisory provisions is also considered. In addition to a consideration of the 
negative effects of mandatory minimum sentences on the Guidelines and minority 
offenders, the Commission’s inability to justify a modified just dessert sentencing 
rationale with prolonged periods of offender incapacitation is also scrutinized. In 
order to dispel the myth of intentional discrimination presented by Albonetti, and to 
further support the argument for the legal, structural causes of discrimination, an 
experiment by David B. Mustard (2001), a professor of Law and Economics at the 
University o f Georgia, and an experiment conducted by Professors Rodney L. 
Engen, a professor at North Carolina State University, and Rodney R. Gainey, a 
professor at Old Dominion University are compared. Mustard applies standard 
regression analysis to the Guidelines determinate sentencing grid and comes to the 
conclusion that the greatest sentencing disparity exists between black male and 
white male offenders who are isolated in a one-on-one basis in the same district 
court with similar characteristics.
Engen and Gainey (2000) assert that standard linear regression analysis is 
unsuited for the determinate sentencing grid because it assumes a linear, additive 
relationship between crime seriousness and criminal history. In order to properly 
control for interaction between these two legal factors, Engen and Gainey assert that 
researchers should be aware that standard linear regression models erroneously 
assume a uniform change in the dependent variable with each unit increase of the 
independent variable. Mustard’s standard regression model does assume a uniform 
change in the dependent variable with each unit increase of the independent 
variable. The Guidelines typically increase the severity of the variables radically for 
more serious offenses, including offenders with drug and weapons related criminal 
histories. Standard regression experiments in the field of criminal law and 
determinate sentencing that fail to control for interaction between legal factors will 
result in distorted extralegal factors. Norval Morris (1990), a professor at the 
University o f Chicago School of Law, asserts that the answer to past discrimination 
against minorities and the legal, structural problems that plague the Guidelines is to 
implement intermediate sanctions in the form of compulsory, community based 
drug rehabilitation programs.
INTRODUCTION
The examination of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and racial, ethnic, and 
gender based sentencing disparity is vital to restore the integrity of the federal court 
system and to insure the longevity of the Guidelines themselves. In order to 
determine the extent of possible minority based sentencing disparity, a qualitative 
study is conducted by contrasting and comparing legal, structural aspects of the 
Guidelines, two controversial experiments in the field of criminal justice and 
sentencing, and the researchers approach to applying their methodology. As a result 
of considering the structural and statistical characteristics of the Guidelines, it is 
determined that minority based sentencing disparity is not due to overt 
discrimination within today’s federal court system, but may be attributed to a long 
history in the United States of past discrimination against minorities and the legal 
structure of the Guidelines. The false perception of intentional racial and ethnic 
sentencing disparity erroneously attributed to the Guidelines is due to the U.S. 
Congress and its willingness to place more emphasis upon the possession, use, and 
distribution of crack cocaine, the historical existence of deeply rooted racial, ethnic, 
and economic discrimination embedded in American culture, and the failure of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission to formulate a sound and well balanced sentencing 
rationale.
In order to define the structural elements of the Guidelines that are responsible 
for creating a false perception of minority based sentencing disparity, a brief 
legislative history of sentencing reform is conducted, the sentencing philosophy and
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methodology drafted and applied by the Congress is scrutinized, and the 
Commission’s inability to translate Congress’ mandate for drug offenses and 
sentencing rationale is examined. Ever since the Guidelines took effect in 
November of 1987, they have been a great source of controversy in legal and 
academic circles. While the Commission faces many challenges as stewards of the 
Guidelines, many legal scholars are guilty of making unfounded assertions that 
federal sentencers are intentionally discriminating against minority offenders. The 
bedrock of determinate sentencing is crime seriousness and criminal history. Crime 
seriousness and criminal history are legal factors. This study demonstrates how the 
failure to properly control for interaction between these two legal factors will lead 
to distorted results for extralegal factors. Thus, minority based sentencing disparity 
is greatly exaggerated. Since minority based sentencing disparity is greatly 
exaggerated, the problem of too much emphasis on crack cocaine violations of 
federal statutes created by the Congress, a long history o f past racial, ethnic, and 
economic discrimination in the United States directed against minorities, and the 
failure o f the Commission to originate a clear sentencing philosophy can be 
mitigated through the implementation of parsimony in the form of intermediate 
sanctions.
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Chapter 1
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: A Brief Overview
The Guidelines are a determinate system of criminal sentencing that was created 
to bring an end to the indeterminate era of criminal rehabilitation and sentencing. 
The rehabilitative or indeterminate approach to sentencing derives from the notion 
that the primary purpose o f the criminal justice system is to make changes in the 
“characters, attitudes, and behaviors of convicted offenders” (Bunzel, 1995, p. 936) 
in order to strengthen society against drug related criminal violations, but also to 
contribute to the welfare o f the offender in question. Indeterminate sentencing was 
not based upon the sentence imposed at conviction, but consisted of the offender’s 
steps toward rehabilitation while they were incarcerated. The determinate approach 
to sentencing is associated with the emphasis on the offense. The indeterminate 
approach is affiliated with a humanistic tradition that assesses the shortcomings of 
the individual and treats the criminal as a “social malfunctioner” that needs to be 
treated or rehabilitated.
The sentencing reform movement and the Guidelines are the products o f the era 
of progressivism. In the past, the progressive movement employed experts in the 
field of criminology, psychology, and the law to analyze and implement public 
policy through research. Sentencing disparity present within the progressive 
approach to the rehabilitation of the criminal mind sparked a need for sentencing 
reform. This desire for sentencing reform resulted in the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act o f 1984 (CCCA) and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). The
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Congress was responsible for drafting the SRA. Congress had three important goals 
when implementing the SRA. First, The Congress sought to implement truth in 
sentencing. Second, they were hoping to achieve reasonable equality in sentencing. 
And third, the Congress wanted proportionality in sentencing. These three 
important elements were to eliminate the negative sentencing disparities present 
within the old federal rehabilitative criminal justice system (Dreissen & Durham, 
2002).
Some elements of progressivism are still evident within the SRA through the 
creation of experts as seen in the Commission. The Commission is a bipartisan 
commission housed in the judicial branch o f the government. “The seven voting 
members on the Commission are appointed by the President of the United States, 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and serve staggered 6 year terms” {Fifteen Years, 
2004, p. 5). The Commission has a history of having federal judges on the panel. 
These federal judges are chosen by the Judicial Conference of the United States and 
are recommended to the President of the United States as candidates for 
appointment to the Commission. The Commission has a member of this six-person 
panel act as chair. The Commission also has three vice chairs. Expressing a need to 
solve social problems through scientific means, the Commission established a 
research and development program to determine the effectiveness of the Guidelines 
and federal criminal justice policy.
The Guidelines have been sharply criticized by lawyers, scholars, and the courts. 
There are three areas that are usually the target of criticism. The first involves the 
loss of the sentencing judge’s discretion. Prior to the CCCA and the SRA, the
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courts were free to apply discretion on a case-by-case basis (Dreissen & Durham, 
2002). There are many legal experts who feel that recent legislation that takes 
historically established discretion away from the federal sentencing judge creates an 
imbalance in the federal criminal justice system.
Second, many legal experts are challenging the approach to policy implemented 
by the Commission. For example, the Commission adopted a modified real offense 
sentencing scheme rather than a charged based system. In addition to this criticism, 
the Commission did not require a burden of proof at the sentencing phase, but wrote 
one in after the district court expressed a need for one.
The final source of criticism is that Guidelines only address one potential source 
of unwarranted disparity they were designed to address. The Guidelines inform the 
judge of her responsibilities and limit her discretion, but they do not legally obligate 
other members to address sentencing issues in a specific manner. Since these 
instructions do not apply to the police, parole officers, or prosecutors, and only 
apply to the judge, the Guidelines may not eliminate sentencing disparity (Dreissen 
& Durham, 2002). The police may affect the ultimate outcome of the sentencing 
process by narrowing the focus of their investigation toward a preconceived 
outcome. Prosecutors have a tremendous amount of power over the outcome of any 
defendant’s sentencing decision. Prosecutors have the discretion to decide what 
evidence will be criminalized.
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Chapter 2
The Rise and Fall o f  Indeterminate Sentencing
Early in the 20th century, the progressive ideal was expressed through 
indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative model. Prisons were no longer 
places to punish offenders, but were institutions where criminals were absolved of 
their moral and social ills (Bunzel, 1995). Parole and probation soon became the 
central pillars o f the rehabilitative model. The indeterminate form of sentencing 
emerged in 1870 and was a program created by the National Congress of the 
American Prison Association at Cincinnati, but the rehabilitative approach to 
sentencing later prevailed due to the work of reformers like John Augustus.
John Augustus was known as the “Father o f Probation” (Bunzel, 1995, p.946). 
He believed that criminal offenders could be reformed and often petitioned the 
court system in Boston Massachusetts to have them released into his custody and 
insured that they were able to find food, shelter, clothing, and work. As a result of 
the efforts of John Augustus and other reformers, in 1878 the State of 
Massachusetts made the probation officer a permanent part of the criminal justice 
system. The probation officer and the rehabilitative approach to sentencing later 
became embedded in the historical fabric of other state jurisdictions, as well as the 
federal criminal justice system. Physicians, sociologists, and psychologists created a 
regimen of treatment to cure the depraved. Indeterminate sentencing allowed expert 
evaluators to determine the length of sentence that would bring the offender to a 
specified place in the rehabilitative continuum (Fifteen Years, 2004).
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Disparity in sentencing criminal offenders started to become an issue of concern 
in the political, legal, and academic world in the 1960’s. This disparity seemed to be 
based upon geography, race, gender, and class (Hall, 1999). The Congress passed 
the SRA in order to address these sentencing disparities. The SRA helped to create 
the Commission. The Commission was responsible for formulating a system of 
determinate or structured mandatory sentencing guidelines to bring an end to the era 
of indeterminate sentencing and broad judicial discretion.
In the 1970’s, the rehabilitative model of criminal sentencing had begun to fall 
into disrepute. Confidence in the rehabilitative model had declined, but faith in the 
progressive method of expert commissions still remained {Fifteen Years, 2004). 
Empirical studies conducted by criminologists and psychologists demonstrated that 
the reform movement was a failure. Other issues regarding the inequality and 
disparity associated with indeterminate sentencing raised issues concerning the rule 
of law. Also, during this time frame, the crime rate in the United States began to 
rise to increasingly high levels. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, steadily increasing 
crime rates brought about the “Age of Backlash” (Bunzel, 1995, p. 946). The Age 
of Backlash was a response to the perceived leniency of the rehabilitative ideal. As 
a result of rising crime rates and the perceived leniency of the criminal justice 
system, Americans began to place pressure on politicians to get tough on crime. 
Essentially, the criminal justice system in America became politicized. Emphasis 
was shifted from the judiciary to the legislature and from the offender to the 
offense. This set the stage for the introduction of a crime control model in the 
United States. Crime control is deterrence and incapacitation.
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In 1971, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 
attempted to eliminate sentencing disparity and implement a program of mandatory 
determinate sentencing. Some delay occurred with sentencing reform as a result of 
partisan politics, but rising crime rates later insured the passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1983 (Webber, 1993). On Octoberl2, 1984, the CCCA was voted 
into law. The CCCA contained the SRA.
The Guidelines represent the shift from the rehabilitative approach to crime and 
indeterminate sentencing to retribution, incapacitation, and a new determinate 
sentencing philosophy in the federal criminal justice system. As support for the 
rehabilitative model began to erode, organizations like the American Friends 
Service Committee began to produce literature that served as the death nail in the 
rehabilitative process (Bunzel, 1995). The American Friends Service Committee, an 
organization dedicated to prison reform, published a report in 1971, criticizing the 
rehabilitative process and indeterminate sentencing. This report later led to the 
creation o f determinate sentencing.
The Committee believed that the theory of indeterminate sentencing was “faulty, 
systematically discriminatory in administration,” (Bunzel, 1995, p.948) and 
inconsistent with the basic principles of the rule of law. The Committee also 
believed that all offenders who were in a broad class, such as the category o f crime 
committed, should be treated alike during the sentencing phase. The Committee 
believed that individual characteristics should not be considered during the 
sentencing process.
Marvin Frankel created the American Friends Service Committee’s manifesto on
determinate sentencing, which later became the forerunner to the Guidelines. 
Marvin Frankel, a former District Judge for the Southern District of New York, 
crystallized the Committee’s penal philosophy by conducting lectures at the 
University o f Cincinnati Law School. He called for a national committee to study 
sentencing, corrections, and parole (Bunzel, 1995). During the same lecture at the 
University of Cincinnati, he also expressed that it was necessary to establish laws 
and rules for sentencing research, including rules that were subject to congressional 
veto (Fifteen Years, 2004, p. 4). Frankel later organized his thoughts on sentencing 
reform in 1972 by writing a book entitled, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order.
In his book, Frankel criticized the use of “judicial discretion, indeterminate and 
rehabilitative sentencing, and individualized justice” (Bunzel, 1995, p. 949). He 
believed that the rehabilitative model as represented through indeterminate 
sentencing was excessively broad. He also believed that the medical parallels that 
were used as a basis for the rehabilitative model were flawed. Judge Frankel did not 
see these offenders as those who were simply ill and were awaiting a cure. He saw 
criminal offenders as miscreants, cold and calculating risk takers, who had flaunted 
morality and public order and were made to pay the price for their transgressions 
with their liberties. Judge Frankel also proposed a permanent national commission 
to study sentencing and to issue rules for “objective, effective, and uniform 
sentencing”. Frankel’s proposal was the forerunner to the Commission and the 
Guidelines.
After the publication of Frankel’s work and rising crime rates in the 1970’s, the 
Congress eventually began to take a harder stance toward crime when revising
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criminal statutes. When the Commission began to promulgate mandatory 
guidelines, statutory laws simply possessed maximum sentences with very little 
emphasis on mandatory minimum sentences for criminal defendants (Hall, 1999).
In 1975, U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a bill during the 94th Congress 
(S.2699) to form the Commission, issue sentencing guidelines, and reduce statutory 
maximum sentences (Fifteen Years, 2004). This legislation was drafted to place 
more emphasis on mandatory minimum sentences and to reduce crime rates.
Another concern in legal, political, and academic circles was the wide discretion 
practiced by judges through indeterminate sentencing. Judicial discretion applied 
through indeterminate sentencing appeared to discriminate against minority groups 
(Hall, 1999). The sentencing reform movements of the 1980’s stem directly from 
this need to address the perceived disparity and subsequent discrimination present 
within the indeterminate sentencing structure.
Politicians, legal scholars, and the general public eventually began to realize that 
there was no truth in sentencing. After the Congress defined criminal violations 
through statutory law, a judge prescribed the appropriate sentence, but the United 
States Parole Commission (USPC) could allow the same offender to serve only 1/3 
of the sentence. Another offender incarcerated for the same crime may be required 
to serve the entire sentence (Dreissen & Durham, 2002). Under the indeterminate 
system of sentencing, the judge and the prosecutor were aware that an offender 
would not serve the entire sentence. This lack of truth in sentencing later became 
apparent to an unsuspecting public in the late 1970’s and the 1980’s.
During the 98th Congress, from 1983 to 1984, Senators Strom Thurmond and
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Paul Laxalt introduced comprehensive crime legislation (S.829) aimed at 
implementing sentencing reform. After Senators Thurmond and Laxalt introduced 
the initial sentencing reform bill on the Senate floor, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings and transformed S.829 into several bills. One of these 
bills was S. 1762, which later became the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1983. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 contained a major section on 
sentencing reform. Another sentencing reform bill was also introduced on to the 
Senate floor at about the same time {Fifteen Years, 2004). This bill was S. 668.
S.668 was very similar to the Title 2 bill created by Senator Edward Kennedy. Both 
S. 1762 and S.668 passed the Senate in 1984. During this same time frame, the 
House Judiciary Committee introduced H.R. 6012. This legislation required 
determinate parole terms and the creation of a part-time commission within the 
Judicial Conference to write advisory sentencing guidelines.
Soon after the House considered H.R. 6012, an amended Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act is merged into an appropriations bill. This bill was passed by the House 
and the Senate, and was signed into law by President of the United States Ronald 
Reagan, on October 12, 1984. This bill became the SRA and established 
Commission. The Commission drafted the Guidelines for the federal court system 
{Fifteen Years, 2004).
From 1985 to 1989, United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer (1988) 
was a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Breyer helped to formulate the 
original Guidelines policies. In 1984, he was a U.S. Senator assigned to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and was involved in efforts to create new federal sentencing
11
legislation that was designed to curb the growing crime rate in the United States and 
bring an end to the era of indeterminate sentencing. In 1988, he authored and 
published a legal research paper for the Hofstra University Law Review entitled 
“The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They 
Rest.” In his research article, Breyer discusses the general principles of the 
Guidelines and some of the controversial issues surrounding federal sentencing 
policy.
When the Commission began writing the new Guidelines in 1985, several states 
in the United States had already placed similar determinate sentencing policies in 
place within their own jurisdictions. Two of these states mentioned in Breyer’s 
(1988) article are Minnesota and Washington. In his article for Hofstra University 
Law Review, Breyer compares the state sentencing policies to federal sentencing 
policy. Essentially, the federal criminal code contained many more crimes than state 
codes. The Minnesota and Washington State commissions wrote guidelines for 250 
and 108 statutory crimes. These state violations consisted of murder, theft, robbery, 
and rape. After comparing the States of Minnesota and Washington to the federal 
system, Breyer came to the conclusion that the federal criminal justice system had 
to deal with 688 different statutes. These federal criminal statutes included complex 
legal issues such as the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act, and the Racketeer and Corrupt 
Organizations Act.
Another issue that Breyer (1988) discusses in his article is the problem of 
writing new federal sentencing policy that extended over 52 state jurisdictions. The 
compact and cohesive cultural, social, and political environments in the various
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states in the United States made it much easier for the individual states to address 
their region’s specific law enforcement needs. This is in stark comparison to the 
diverse requirement of the federal sentencing statutes.
In his article, Breyer (1988) also outlined the primary purpose o f the new federal 
sentencing statutes. He explains that the primary purpose was honesty in 
sentencing. Honesty meant that when an offender was sentenced and incarcerated 
for a set number of years, the offender actually had to serve this amount of time in 
prison. Breyer explains that the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee responded by 
abolishing parole. The only exception to this particular action would be 54 days of 
good time granted to each offender per year.
The second purpose o f the Guidelines was to reduce sentencing disparity. Breyer 
(1988) explains that some sentences handed down for the same crime may result in 
a sentencing disparity of 17 years difference between different federal circuit 
courts. Sentences for the same crime committed in California may be 6 months 
longer than those committed in the Deep South. Black male offenders may receive 
longer sentences than a white female offender for the same crime. Finally, Breyer 
asserted in his article that the remedy for this type of regional, race, and gender 
disparity was the Commission. Breyer believed that the Commission would regulate 
the Guidelines through research and an incremental form of evolutionary revision.
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Chapter 3 
Determinate Sentencing and the States
In the United States, there is a long history of experimentation with public 
policy. The states often act as a laboratory for policies that are later refined and 
implemented on a national level (Dreissen & Durham, 2002). The United States 
Supreme Court cites this as an advantage of federalism. The states have served for 
the last 30 years as a proving ground for sentencing reform.
Beginning in the 1970’s, state level officials began to realize that indeterminate 
sentencing was an ineffective and unfair means of applying punishment. State law 
enforcement administrators began to reform the courts in order to implement a 
structured or determinate system of criminal justice (Dreissen & Durham, 2002). A 
few states completely overhauled their court systems and made an immediate and 
decisive change to determinate sentencing. Other states made changes through trial 
and error over a longer span o f time.
There are several types of determinate sentencing provisions, and many states 
have adopted a combination of these methods. Mandatory minimum sentence laws 
insure that offenders serve a minimum length of time in prison for certain offenses 
(Moore & Miethe, 1986). Truth-in-sentencing laws require that an offender must 
serve a certain minimum proportion of the sentence granted before parole officials 
may even consider this offender for release from prison. Two-or three-strike laws 
require incarceration, which eliminates a judge’s discretion to offer probation as a 
sentence, when an offender is convicted of a serious felony more than once.
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On the state level, one of the most successful determinate sentencing programs 
was created by the State of Minnesota. Minnesota’s determinate sentencing 
program went into effect on May 1, 1980. Minnesota adopted a commission 
approach to sentencing. There are two important elements contained within the 
Minnesota determinate sentencing program that insures its’ success. The first 
consists of a “modified just-deserts” (Moore & Miethe, 1986, p. 256) approach to 
criminal punishment in which the focus of a criminal sanction is based upon the 
seriousness of the offense and the offender’s criminal history. It is simply 
concerned with retribution. It is a sentencing philosophy that is focused on 
punishment for the criminal act and past criminal acts rather than demonstrating 
concern for “deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation”. This allowed emphasis to be 
placed upon the seriousness of the offense and crimes against persons. The 
retributionist theory of criminal punishment eliminated offender and case 
characteristics that had previously been a part of past sentencing policies. The 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC) insured that sentencing 
would be neutral according to “race, gender, social, or economic status of the 
offender”. The MSGC also insured that State guidelines prohibited judges from 
taking into consideration “race, sex, employment status, education, marital status, 
and the offender’s exercise of constitutional rights during the adjudication process”.
Another asset to the success of the Minnesota determinate sentencing program 
was the MSGC’s application of the sentencing guidelines as law rather than as 
advisory policy. While the guidelines allow for departures from the law, these 
departures must be justified by the sentencing judge in writing. Reasons for
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aggravating or mitigating departures are clearly defined for the judge and references 
during the sentencing phase to the “exercise of an offender’s rights, race, or social 
class” (Moore & Miethe, 1986, p. 257) are specifically prohibited. Any other 
departures from the guidelines should be embarked upon for “substantial and 
compelling” reasons. Any sentences based upon unauthorized reasons may be 
appealed. If the Minnesota sentencing guidelines were advisory, all o f these strict 
legal sentencing controls over the use of offender attributes would be voluntary.
16
Chapter 4
The United States Sentencing Commission and Structure
The Commission uses a sentencing grid to determine the length of incarceration 
(see Appendix A). When the Commission considers criminal sanctions, they 
consider the severity of the crime from the most to the least severe and place it 
along one axis of the sentencing grid. The criminal history score is placed on the 
opposite axis. The sentencing table is broken down into zones. A is the least severe 
sentencing zone. D is the most severe sentencing zone (Guidelines Manual, 2006). 
Where the two axes intersect, a sentencing score or range has been literally 
determined.
The sentencing judge applies the guidelines established by the Commission to a 
base offense level (1-43) according to the specific crime that has been committed. 
“A total offense level of less then 1 is to be treated as an offense level of 1” 
{Guideline Manual, 2006, p. 382). “An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated 
as an offense level of 43” {Guideline Manual, 2006, p. 382). This criminal base 
offense level may be adjusted according to any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances that may be related to the offense and the offender.
The judge also computes the offender’s criminal history category (1-6) where 
points for prior criminal convictions are tallied and a criminal history category for 
sentencing purposes is established. Additional sanctions are considered for Career 
Offender and Armed Career Offender {Guideline Manual, 2006). The criminal base 
offense level and the criminal history score are added together for the total.
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Next, a departure provision which allows the judge to deviate from the average 
Guideline sentence is applied to the total criminal base offense level score. The 
departure provision assumes that the judge may issue a sentence within the 
appropriate sentencing range. She may depart from the score obtained through the 
average application of the sentencing grid by considering any aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances that may be attached to the case (Webber, 1993). The 
departure provision is very controversial because it appears to be a judicial 
discretionary provision within a determinate sentencing framework.
According to statute, “the number of months of incarceration established as the 
top of any guideline range cannot exceed the number of months at the bottom of 
that range by more than 6 months or 25%” (Dreissen & Durham, 2002, p. 632). If 
this method of allocution is carried out, the general assumption is that defendants 
charged with similar crimes will receive similar sanctions. This sentence should not 
vary “any more than 6 months in comparison to the number of months equal to 25% 
of the total guideline range.” This should be a consistent standard implemented 
nationwide with every judge, district, or circuit.
One reason for the lack of sentencing structure in the SRA is that members of 
the Congress had very little or no practical experience sentencing offenders to 
prison. One could easily come to the conclusion that the allotment of three judges 
on the original Commission was inadequate (“Crime Package,” 1984). For example, 
not many people are capable of sentencing a first time offender found guilty of drug 
distribution to 15 years in prison where the previous penalty under federal law was 
merely 5 years. The distribution of illegal substances is a serious offense, but, as a
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result o f preexisting mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking, sentencers 
are unable to use the Guidelines to properly consider mitigating circumstances.
The Guidelines operate under a system of real offense sentencing. Real offense 
sentencing requires the judge to identify unlawful acts, omissions, attempted threats 
or harms that were carried out against the victim. The Commission was charged 
with deciding between two criminal sentencing philosophies (Silets & Brenner, 
1986). The U.S. Sentencing Commission could choose between a real offense 
system o f sentencing based upon the illegal conduct that the offender actually 
engaged in while committing the offense, or they had the option of choosing a 
system based upon what the offender was actually charged and convicted o f in a 
federal court o f law. The Commission chose a real offense system o f sentencing, 
because they felt that real offense sentencing would represent the sentencing 
reforms required by the SRA. Another important factor outlined by the SRA was 
the judge factor. The Congress wanted federal judges to remain within a certain 
parameter. Sentencing was to be seen as a formalized predictable exercise in 
jurisprudence. The problem with this approach to sentencing is that it required a 
complete overhaul of the federal criminal justice system. The sentencing judge has 
gone from using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to being forced to 
determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant simply based upon the 
preponderance of the evidence.
Because of the lack o f judicial experience in the Congress, and later on the 
Commission, the reforms implemented may have gone too far and drastically 
altered the very foundation of Anglo-American justice. Completely replacing the
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process of judicial discretion with a structured or calculated procedure has pushed 
the federal court system past the point of sound constitutional legal practices (Silets 
& Brenner, 1986). Under the Guidelines, the emphasis in determining guilt is 
placed upon all the harms that the offender actually caused while committing the 
crime. The problem with this approach to determining guilt and defining culpability 
is that these acts are intermingled with the conduct that constitutes the criminal 
charge itself.
If the real elements are something other than the crime charged, one must 
wonder, what exactly are they? Essentially, they are facts or conduct that the 
government was unable to prove in a court of law. Instead of proving facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, these elements are introduced at a hearing and the criminal law is 
simply reduced to the lowest levels of procedural law (Silets & Brenner, 1986).
This leaves the defendant with having to prove his or her innocence where they 
have not been charged. This is in direct conflict with the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard. Since the Guidelines are based upon a modified real offense system rather 
than a strict charge or conviction sentencing rationale, the standardized sentencing 
structure sought by the SRA is undermined. A conviction based system would not 
entangle the court in vague and often complex proceedings and would insure that 
hearings are fair and sentences are completely justified. If the Congress was 
attempting to create a system of criminal sentencing that is fair and would actually 
have a direct impact on crime, they should have chosen a charge of conviction 
sentencing system that relies upon standardized penalties for each type of crime 
committed. Since the Congress failed to choose a conviction based system, it is
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nearly impossible for the Congress, the courts, and the Commission to monitor the 
success of the Guidelines. The performance of a modified real offense system of 
sentencing is too uneven in its characteristics and is difficult to gather consistent 
data that would act as an indicator regarding the success or failure o f the 
Guidelines.
Indigent defendants are at a disadvantage under a real sentencing system. Many 
inmates in the U.S. Prison system believe that they are incarcerated because the 
incompetence o f their legal counsel. When the Commission promulgated the 
Guidelines in 1987, the defense lawyer’s role in sentencing changed. The 
prosecutor is now in control of a process that once was the sole discretion of federal 
district court judges (Hall, 1999). The lack of the public defender’s resources and 
the new found powers of the prosecuting attorney to obtain a plea or an extremely 
lengthy sentence may determine a defendant’s punishment.
Those represented by public defenders are especially disadvantaged under the 
new determinate sentencing guidelines. Under the old indeterminate system of 
federal sentencing, the public defender was already severely taxed with and 
overwhelming responsibility to represent those who could not afford an attorney. 
Under the Guidelines, the public defender spends much of her time attempting to 
simply minimize harsh and lengthy sentences. Defense counsel is now forced to 
prepare for two hearings. The first hearing consists of the statutory charges and 
evidence that will be presented to the jury (Hall, 1999). The second hearing is a 
departure hearing that consists of aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may 
be presented during the sentencing phase and may lead to another sentence.
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The public defender’s responsibilities have increased while their effectiveness 
has decreased, but the standard for proving ineffective assistance o f counsel 
remains the same. Politics have also contributed to a smaller budget for the public 
defender’s office. An overzealous prosecutor gladly uses these issues to dispose of 
cases in a quick and cost effective manner (Hall, 1999).
A defendant’s ability or inability to hire a lawyer may have a direct impact upon 
the length o f their sentence under the Guidelines. A defendant’s lawyer needs to 
make sound legal arguments, perform important criminal investigations, and 
successfully carry out the appropriate legal research. The judge no longer has the 
power to keep the prosecutor from seeking undue plea bargains and lengthy prison 
sentences (Hall, 1999). The pendulum of power has swung in the prosecutor’s 
favor. The only individual to stem the tide under the new Guidelines system is an 
overworked an underpaid public defender who is attempting to deal with statutory 
evidence and the ever evolving Commission’s promulgations. At this point, the 
defendant is forced to gamble. Should the defendant plead guilty to a crime that 
they did not commit, or should they prepare a defense and take the chance of 
spending a good portion of their life in prison? Under the determinate system, the 
defendant is solely at the mercy of the prosecutor.
It is exactly this type o f disparity that makes the new Guidelines very similar to 
the disparities found under the old indeterminate system of sentencing. Instead of 
the sentencing judge, the new factors that determine an indigent defendant’s prison 
sentence have evolved into the goals o f an ambitious prosecutor and the 
competence o f a public defender with an ever expanding caseload (Hall, 1999).
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Instead of fighting the charge and proving their innocence, an indigent defendant is 
simply attempting to implement damage control and minimize their sentence.
The Guidelines were designed to eliminate these kinds of disparities, but now 
an offender’s sentence is reliant upon effective assistance of counsel now more than 
ever in the history of American jurisprudence (Hall, 1999).These disparities in 
sentencing for criminal violations may lead to an increase in prison overcrowding 
and violence, a decrease in law-abiding behavior in the general public, and a decline 
in the effectiveness o f the criminal justice system and its ability to make an impact 
upon crime.
Over time, the Guidelines have evolved into a confusing, mixed system of 
criminal sentencing with both real offense and charge offense elements. Initially, 
the Commission considered implementing a pure real offense system of criminal 
sentencing, but was forced to abandon this idea after a period of time due to 
complex mathematical formulas that were found to be impracticable. The 
Commission was concerned that the quadratic root formulas applied to the new real 
offense system of sentencing would actually cause sentencing disparity. To avoid 
the risk of undermining the Guidelines with a real offense system that produced 
sentencing disparity, the Commission was forced to move toward a charge offense 
system of sentencing {Guidelines Manual, 2006).
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Chapter 5 
Minority Based Sentencing Disparity
The perception of intentional, racial, and ethnic sentencing disparity erroneously 
attributed to the Guidelines is due to the historical existence of deeply rooted racial 
and economic discrimination embedded in American culture. Norval Morris and 
Michael Tonry (1990) assert that black males in America per 100, 000 are more 
than 7 times as likely to be incarcerated as white adult males. Morris and Tonry 
certainly believe that the American criminal justice system has a secondary effect 
upon disproportionate incarceration rates for black males, but, primarily, this kind 
o f disparity between blacks and whites is “deeply rooted in history” (p.32) and 
social structure. “The primary cause for large numbers of black males being 
incarcerated more often and for longer periods of time is due to the fact that certain 
federal crimes committed disproportionately by blacks are punished more severely 
than crimes that are committed disproportionately by white males” (Klein & 
Steiker, 2002, p.237).
When taking into consideration cocaine violations, these disproportionate 
incarceration rates are also due to the Congress placing more emphasis upon the 
possession, use, and distribution of crack cocaine. The largest cause o f disparity 
between blacks and white offenders within the federal criminal justice system takes 
place when federal prosecutors are given discretion to circumvent the Guidelines in 
order to give sentence reductions to those offenders who cooperate with the 
government by giving information or testifying against other defendants (Klein &
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Steiker, 2002). As a result of past discrimination and economic deprivation, black 
males are especially vulnerable to the awesome discretionary powers of the federal 
prosecutors.
“Black males consist o f approximately 12 % of the population in the United 
States, and 13 % of its drug users, but account for 33 % of the drug related arrests” 
(Sandy, 2003, p. 4). Black males also account for 62 % of drug-related convictions, 
and 70 % of drug related incarcerations. In 1980, there was approximately 3 times 
the number o f black males in college as there was in prison or jail. Within 2 
decades, there were actually fewer black males in college than there were in prison 
or jail.
Critical race theory may offer some explanation as to why disproportionate 
numbers o f blacks come into contact with the criminal justice system in America. 
Critical race theorists believe that race is a social construct that is a permanent 
fixture in American language, perceptions, and culture. In any culture, people feel a 
need to categorize others and the American culture is no different. These categories, 
as misguided as they may be, is an attempt by people to understand others and the 
world around them. These kinds of interpretations can often go unchecked and 
manifest themselves as social norms. The dominant race in any given culture may 
use these kinds of superficial observations and interpretations regarding people of 
other races to “solidify their power” (Sandy, 2003, p. 5) over minorities. This is 
especially true in political and legal systems. The United States was founded during 
a time in history when racial differences were self-evident and this interpretation of 
racial distinctions has become firmly embedded into the American culture.
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When drafting the SRA, Congress made it apparent that the past practice of 
allowing judges to consider and weigh personal information about the criminal 
offender should continue under the new legislation. The Congress did not want any 
limitation placed on the information that may allow a federal district court judge to 
assess the “background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense” 
(Freed, 1992, p. 1715) for the purpose of imposing a sentence upon them. The 
Congress also instructed the Commission to consider other personal information 
when relevant to the case. The Congress asked the Commission to focus on “age, 
education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition, 
drug dependence, previous employment record, family ties, responsibilities, and 
community ties.” The role in the offense, the offender’s criminal history, and 
dependence upon a life o f crime for their livelihood was also expected to be 
considered, but these final three elements were part of the formal sentencing 
criteria.
The Congress did not want the sentencing judge to be limited in regards to the 
consideration of background information and characteristics about the offender. The 
Congress made the Commission the sole decision maker regarding the legal 
relevance of this information. Five o f the background characteristics were found to 
be unsuited for sentencing purposes. This directly conflicted with U.S.C. 18 and 28, 
which provide standards for imposing prison sentences. In order to reconcile this 
difference, the Commission simply implemented the unlimited discretion of the 
sentencing judge directly into the Guidelines Manual (Freed, 1992).
The federal sentencing judge may also depart from the Guidelines based upon
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offender characteristics. The judge may depart from the guidelines based upon “not 
ordinarily relevant” (Guidelines Manual, 2006, p. 435) offender characteristics. 
Though offender characteristics are actually defined in the Guidelines Manual as 
not ordinarily relevant, the sentencing judge may circumvent the Guidelines at this 
juncture by declaring the offenders characteristics as “present to an exceptional 
degree”.
In her study entitled, “Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Effects o f Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence 
Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992,” Professor Celesta A. Albonetti (1997), a 
professor of sociology at the University of Iowa, discusses four theories that 
directly effect the discretion of judges, prosecutors, and probation officers: labeling 
theory; the structural perspective of rational decision making; social-psychological 
perspective o f causal attribution in punishment; and uncertainty avoidance-causal 
attribution in punishment perspective.
Labeling theory is when minority offenders who are male and less educated will 
receive harsher sentences compared with white male or female offenders. For 
example, instead of taking into consideration that an otherwise law abiding black or 
Hispanic male has simply committed a first time mistake by getting involved with 
drugs, a judge or prosecutor may simply assume that an offender is a gang member 
or drug dealer (Albonetti, 1997).
The merger of the structural perspective of rational decision making and social- 
psychological perspective of causal attribution in punishment implies that 
“sentencers attempt to achieve rational outcomes as a result o f a lack of knowledge
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by relying upon stereotypes that suggest that certain defendant groups are 
potentially repeat offenders. Albonetti (1997) asserts that from these psychological 
theories, social perspectives, and stereotypes come very harsh sentences. Albonetti 
also believes that lengthy sentences are handed down by federal sentencers to insure 
that those who are perceived to be a member of a potentially dangerous offender 
groups will not become repeat offenders.
Uncertainty avoidance-causal attribution in punishment perspective takes place 
when a white defendant benefits more from a judicial Guideline departure. This 
means that the judge’s only opportunity to exercise discretion under the Guidelines 
creates a disadvantage for minority offenders. Based upon these facts, it appears 
that departures regarding substantial assistance and acceptance of responsibility 
create unwarranted sentencing disparity. Albonetti (1997) believes that these four 
theories are affecting the consistency of the Guidelines and mandatory minimum 
statutes.
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Chapter 6 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences
The perception of intentional racial and ethnic sentencing disparity erroneously 
attached to the Guidelines and cocaine related violations of federal law is due to a 
combination of mandatory minimum sentences created by the Congress, and the 
Congress’ willingness to place more emphasis upon the possession, use, and 
distribution of crack cocaine. United States cocaine policy is influenced by 
populism. The populist approach to public policy is based upon gut reaction, 
common sense, and the pendulum of public opinion {Fifteen Years, 2004). The 
main goal of legislators is to stay in office. Crime is the one key public concern that 
inflames constituents. A legislator giving a fiery stump speech about rising crime 
rates in America has been the fuel on the fire of political debate throughout the 
history of the United States. Crime fighting is the sphere where legislators can 
please their constituents the most (Stuntz, 2001).
In order to please their constituents, legislators must draft rules that are simple 
and easy for the public to understand. When legislators are able to produce catch 
phrases related to violent crime, their constituents seem to respond. Mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug and gun crimes are the kind of plain language that will 
generate votes (Stuntz, 2001). Politicians will often mention harsher prison terms, 
but rarely do they take a comprehensive public policy position on matters of crime.
The second legislative goal is taking popular symbolic stands. Populism is 
overwhelmingly apparent when legislators take symbolic stands on drug policy.
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Sometimes new crime problems will rear their ugly heads, but at the time that a 
crime wave is taking place, legislators can do little about it. Once members of 
Congress have an opportunity to address these kinds of criminal matters, they often 
cease the moment and draft legislation that results in excessively harsh prison 
sentences (Stuntz, 2001).
The use of powder cocaine escalated in the 1970’s. Many people who used 
powder cocaine smoked the substance through a method known as free basing. Free 
basing is one o f the most dangerous ways of smoking cocaine (Sandy, 2003). Free 
basing cocaine has been proven to give the same affect as smoking crack cocaine, 
but the media failed to sensationalize the use of powder cocaine and refused to pose 
affluent white users as dangerous criminals.
The crack cocaine legislation drafted in the Congress is symbolic drug policy that 
is rooted in populism. In the 1980’s, under the Reagan administration, the first 
batches o f crack cocaine were introduced into a few urban ghettos, and the media 
posed crack cocaine as a unique “demon drug” (Sandy, 2003, p. 8) that was unlike 
any drug that had come before it. Legislators ceased upon the media craze and later 
rode the public wave of dissent in order to wring as many votes out of the crack 
cocaine hysteria as possible. Crack was portrayed by the media to be “highly potent, 
instantly addictive, and conducive to systematic violence and moral decadence.” 
While crack cocaine is much cheaper and more accessible than free base, the 
absorption rate into the user’s system is much faster. As far as the chemical 
composition of the two drugs is concerned, powder cocaine and crack cocaine are 
identical. The only difference between the two forms of the drug is that crack
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cocaine has been demonized and associated through the media with the urban 
minority populations, while free basing powder cocaine is more acceptable due to 
its association with trendy and affluent whites.
In today’s federal sentencing scheme, mandatory minimum sentences have been 
expanded to include entire classes of offenses. Many of these sentences stem from 
drug offenses. Mandatory minimum sentences are statutory requirements that insure 
that a person convicted o f a specific offense shall receive at least the minimum 
sentence prescribed by law (Free, 1997). The SRA has also changed the federal 
sentencing landscape. In order to understand sentencing reform in the United States, 
it is necessary to understand the concept o f mandatory minimums.
Mandatory minimums began in 1956 when the Narcotic Control Act required 
minimum sentences for the possession and distribution of illegal substances. By 
1970, mandatory minimums had been cast aside by the Congress. The Congress 
replaced mandatory minimums with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act.
Mandatory minimums were reintroduced into the federal sentencing landscape in 
1984. When the U.S. Congress created the SRA, they also reintroduced mandatory 
minimums back into the federal criminal justice system. Soon, more than 60 federal 
offenses were punishable by mandatory minimum sentences (Free, 1997). This new 
federal legislation focused upon drug possession, drug distribution, and violent 
crime. Drugs and violent crime are a deadly mixture that often goes hand-in-hand. 
Between 1984 and 1990, 91 % o f offenders in the federal criminal justice system 
sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences were convicted for drug offenses.
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The War on Drugs has contributed to the disproportionate racial and ethnic 
balance o f offenders in the U.S. prison system. The supply side approach to 
attacking the drug problem in the United States has created disproportionate 
increases in the prison population since 1985 (Blumstein, 1993). The theory of 
incapacitation does not work. A demand for cocaine still exists because there are 
other dealers on the street waiting to take the incarcerated offender’s place. 
Deterrence has failed for the very same reason that incapacitation has failed. Those 
who are actually deterred are immediately replaced by those who are willing to 
distribute illegal substances.
Harsher penalties for drug possession and distribution have contributed to the 
racial imbalance of incarceration in the federal prison system. From 1970, until 
1980, the arrest rates for whites were higher than those for nonwhites (Blumstein, 
1993). Arrest rates for both groups are derived from a rate of about 10 per 10,000 
juveniles in 1965, to a peak of approximately 30 times higher in 1974. This 
amounts to 329 for whites and 257 for minorities.
After 1974, arrest rates for drug offenses declined in the United States. This drop 
in the number o f arrests was due to the cultural revolution of the 1960’s and the 
unwillingness o f legislators to criminalize the possession and use of marihuana by 
middle and upper class whites (Blumstein, 1993). After 1974, arrest rates for both 
whites and nonwhites continued to decline. For nonwhites, arrest rates leveled out 
in the early 1980’s and began to increase at a rate of between 20% and 25% per 
year, until arrests finally peaked in 1989. This clearly demonstrates a direct 
correlation between deliberate choices in drug policy and drug enforcement.
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The War on Drugs continued to contribute to sentencing disparity for drug 
crimes in the latter part of the 1980’s. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed 
by the Congress. This act established mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
distribution based upon the quantity of the illegal substance confiscated at arrest 
and the type o f drug confiscated (Free, 1997). Based upon past employment 
discrimination, limited economic opportunities, and cheap and easy accesses to 
crack cocaine, minorities were more likely to be charged with the possession and 
distribution of crack cocaine. Whites were more likely to be charged with powder 
cocaine offenses. The lack of community based drug treatment programs for crack 
cocaine created further disparity in drug sentences between white and nonwhite 
offenders.
Based upon a study conducted by the Commission for the fiscal year 1990, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that blacks were more likely than whites to be 
convicted under mandatory minimum drug statutes. The Commission came to this 
conclusion even though black defendants amounted to a smaller percentage of the 
defendant population when compared to white defendants. Blacks amounted to 28.2 
% o f the total of all federal defendants (Free, 1997, p. 275). This figure should be 
closely compared with 38.5 % of black defendants who were convicted under 
mandatory minimum statutes. In comparison, figures for whites were 46.9 % and 
34.8 %.
In their study regarding information gathered from fiscal year 1990, the 
Commission also found that “African Americans were more likely then either 
whites or Hispanics to be sentenced at or above the mandatory minimum” (Free,
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1997, p. 275). More than 2/3 (67.7 %) of black offenders received sentences that 
were at or above mandatory minimum provisions. When taking white and Hispanic 
offenders and their sentences for the same criminal violation into consideration, 
whites were at 54 % and Hispanics were at 57.1 %.
Much of the disparity under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines can be attributed to 
the emphasis on drug offenses. Emphasis on drug offenses can be analyzed by 
comparing data before 1984 to data on drug offenses after the Guidelines took 
effect in 1987. In 1986, only 19 % of all blacks convicted in federal court were 
convicted for drug offenses. By the early part of 1990, the conviction rate for drug 
offenses had risen to 46 %. The conviction rate for whites amounted to 26 % in 
1986 and 35 % in 1990. This demonstrates that the conviction rate and the harsh 
sentences that follow are directly affected by drug policy. Before the 
implementation of the Guidelines “whites were more likely than blacks to be 
convicted o f drug trafficking, whereas the reverse was true after these provisions 
went into effect.”
The change in drug policy actually had a very profound effect on black males in 
the United States who were charged for crack cocaine offenses. The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 determined that 1 gram of cocaine is equal to 100 grams of 
powder cocaine. Since crack cocaine is a cheaper more accessible form of the drug, 
many blacks whose families were denied economic opportunities in the United 
States through years o f employment discrimination found crack cocaine to be an 
inexpensive remedy to some of their economic, social, and personal woes. 
Unfortunately, for blacks who are charged with possession and distribution of crack
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cocaine, 5 or more grams of this substance results in a mandatory 5 year prison 
sentence (Free, 1997). Before the Guidelines came into effect in 1987, a first time 
offender who was convicted with this same amount of cocaine would have been 
given probation, but under the new provisions for drug violations, offenders are 
now subject to incarceration.
When Congress created the 1986 Act, the Commission was in the process of 
formulating the new Guidelines. The Commission responded to this new legislation 
by incorporating the mandatory minimum statutes into the Guidelines and using 
them as a basis to establish and calculate upward and downward sentencing ranges 
for federal crimes.
Offenses involving 5 grams or more of crack cocaine or 500 grams or more of 
powder cocaine were assigned a base offense level [level 26] corresponding to a 
Sentencing Guideline range o f 63 to 78 months for a defendant in Criminal 
History Category One. {Report to Congress, 2007, p. 3)
This was a Guideline range that exceeded the 5 year statutory penalty by 3 
months. Previously, offenses involving 50 grams or more of crack cocaine or 5, 000 
grams or more of powder cocaine were assigned a base level offense of 32. This 
corresponds to a Guideline range o f 121 to 151 months for an offender in Criminal 
History Category One; this offense results in an additional 30 days of incarceration 
when compared to the 10 year mandatory minimum for the same offense. Crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine offenses for possession of the drug that were above or 
below the mandatory minimum were set proportionately using the same 100:1 drug 
quantity standard.
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Because o f the 100:1 drug quantity standard, the Sentencing Guideline penalties, 
which are based solely upon quantity, are 3 to 6 times longer for crack cocaine 
offenders than for powder cocaine offenders who were arrested with the same 
quantity of the drug (Report to Congress, 2007). As a result of the differences 
between federal mandatory minimum standards and the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
penalties for crack cocaine are much longer than the sentences for powder cocaine 
for the same unlawful possession of this illegal substance.
First time offenders charged with crack cocaine violations received very harsh 
sentences as a result o f mandatory minimum statutes. When drafting the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Congress drew a bright line between penalties for crack cocaine 
and sentences for powder cocaine. The 1988 Act established a mandatory minimum 
sentence for first time possession of crack cocaine. This is the only federal 
mandatory minimum penalty for a first offense of “simple possession of a 
controlled substance” (Report to Congress, 2007, p. 4). Today, possession of 5 
grams or more of crack cocaine will result in a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 
years for the first offense. “Simple possession of any quantity of any other 
controlled substance by a first time offender is a misdemeanor offense punishable 
by a maximum of one year in prison.” (.Report to Congress, 2007, p. 4) This means 
that a first time offender who simply possesses 5 grams of crack cocaine or more 
will receive the same sentence as a first time convicted trafficker of powder 
cocaine.
Many believe that crack cocaine is more addictive than powdered cocaine. A 
study by the Careers in Crack Project asserts that crack cocaine is no more addictive
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than powdered cocaine. Another myth is that those who use crack cocaine are more 
apt to engage in violent behavior. According to the Careers in Crack Cocaine 
Project study, the element of violence surrounding crack cocaine does not come 
from users of the drug, but directly stems from the sale o f the drug (Free, 1997). It 
appears that the turf wars and quick money associated with the sale of crack cocaine 
is the key to understanding and resolving the violence surrounding crack cocaine.
Another myth that surrounds crack cocaine is that it is an illegal substance that is 
far removed from the powder form of the drug. It is important to note that the mood 
altering ingredient present in powdered cocaine is also present in crack cocaine. If 
powder cocaine is dissolved in water and injected intravenously, the 
pharmacological effect is very similar to smoking crack cocaine (Free, 1997). 
Powder cocaine can be transformed very easily into crack cocaine by placing 
powder cocaine, baking soda, and water into a covered jar and mixing the contents 
of the jar by shaking it in order to remove the hydrochloride element from the 
powder cocaine.
Another problem the Congress failed to consider was the potentially negative 
effect that preexisting mandatory minimum legislation may have on the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. Once again, the primary goal of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines is proportionality or fairness. The Commission responded to Congress’ 
mandate regarding proportionality by creating a “continuum of graduated increases 
and decreases in sentence severity from a wide variety o f aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances” (Lowenthal, 1993, p. 92). The Congress failed to 
consider that previous mandatory minimum legislation would isolate aggravating
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circumstances and create a disproportionate increase whenever the mandatory 
minimum statutes intermingled with the proportionate goals of the Guidelines.
The mandatory minimum statutes created complications for the Commission 
regarding the application of sentencing ranges for drug trafficking offenses. The 
Commission could either “coordinate the drug trafficking guidelines with the 
mandatory minimum sentencing statues” (Lowenthal, 1993, p. 93) and disregard the 
individual proportional due process, or it could sentence drug traffickers in a 
manner that was inconsistent with mandatory minimum laws. Unfortunately, the 
Commission chose to sacrifice proportionality when sentencing drug traffickers.
The Congress’ attempt to double their crime fighting efforts resulted in redundant 
and conflicting penalties for crack cocaine possession.
Another problem regarding the Guidelines is the dual role that the Congress and 
the Commission assign to the quantity of illegal substances. The Congress placed 
emphasis upon culpability, assuming that the quantity of a drug that an offender is 
associated with reflects their status within a particular drug operation (Hafer & 
Allenbaugh, 2003). The Commission is more concerned with the harm that large 
quantity of illegal substances like crack cocaine may have on the individual and the 
community. Since the purpose of the quantity of illegal substances is ambiguous, 
judges are simply left to weigh the drugs and calculate disproportionate sentences 
as they are related to the offender’s culpability.
Contradictory congressional directives have also led to the need to quell political 
and public pressure, while at the same time, insisting upon a fair and consistent 
sentencing system. A good example o f these contradictory directives would be the
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elements in the SRA that require two adult prior convictions for drug trafficking to 
result in sentencing under special circumstances (Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003).
Chapter Four of the Guidelines (4B1.1), which is associated with 28 USC 994 
(h) requires those with two prior adult drug trafficking violations, essentially career 
criminals, to receive at or near the maximum penalty (Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003). 
These kinds of ambiguous congressional directives have resulted in the 
Commission and federal judges being faced with a policy dilemma. The Congress 
sought to establish a fair and proportionate sentencing philosophy, but asked federal 
judges to make exceptions for drug offenses. These kinds of contradictory 
directives have led to disproportionate sentences for drug offenders within an 
allegedly consistent sentencing framework, as well as prison over-crowding and too 
much emphasis being placed on crack cocaine violations. The extreme 100: 1 ratio 
has created many legal challenges, bringing into question the constitutional 
application of this segment o f the Guidelines, but the United States Supreme Court 
has not found any “racially discriminatory purpose, explicit or inferable, on the part 
of law m akers]” (Haude, 1996, p. 2).
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Chapter 7
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Sixth and Eighth Amendments
As a result o f the constitutional system of checks and balances, the Congress and 
the Court have a very unique relationship. The Congress reacts to evolving social 
and legal trends by drafting legislation that will enable the federal criminal justice 
system to confront these changing social and legal standards on a daily basis. As 
social, cultural, and legal trends change over long periods of time, the Court may 
update public policies by striking down laws that are determined to be 
unconstitutional or antiquated. This back and forth exchange of legal concepts can 
be seen in the evolving significance o f the Guidelines. An examination of the 6th 
and, 8th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution is vital in order to obtain a clear 
understanding of the various challenges presented by crack cocaine, minority based 
sentencing disparity, and the Guidelines.
The 6 Amendment to the Constitution plays a vital role in determining the 
significance o f the Guidelines. The Founding Fathers believed that a trial by jury 
was an important part o f the Constitution’s system of check’s and balances. The 
executive and legislative branch could not punish a person without the involvement 
and consent of the masses. A jury o f the defendant’s peers acted as a system of 
checks and balances against the threat of judicial despotism (Clary, 2006).
The Framers concern regarding wrongful punishment and a lack of due process 
grew out of Colonial America’s struggles with the English Crown. The Crown 
attempted to limit the powers of the Colonies to govern them and conduct their own
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business by removing the right of a jury trial for certain offenses. Criminal court 
was a battle ground between the Colonies and the Crown (Clary, 2006). The 
Colonial powers regularly attempted to use the criminal courts to challenge the 
authority o f the Crown to try persons for political offenses and violations of revenue 
laws. The 6th Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury. At the time of 
the framing of the Constitution, trial by jury meant that the truth of every criminal 
accusation should be confirmed by 12 of the defendant’s peers.
There are two principles regarding the 6th Amendment and its application that 
must be considered if  the true purpose of the Amendment is to be understood 
properly. First, “the 6th Amendment does not prevent fundamentally unfair trials” 
(Jonakait, 1992, p. 744). It insures that a criminal defendant receives a certain type 
of trial. The 6th Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant “a public and speedy 
trial decided by impartial jurors” who are informed from the defense’s perspective.
The 6th Amendment guarantees a trial by jury, but many jurorists consider a 
bench trial to be fair. Even though a judge who gives a criminal defendant a bench 
trial is certainly capable of being fair and impartial, a defendant is denied their 
unique constitutional right to a trial by jury. Due process and the 6th Amendment 
may have some similar characteristics and uses, but they are not one in the same.
Under the 6th Amendment, the accused is not provided with the most efficient 
fact finding process, but must simply have a trial by an impartial jury who is willing 
to scrutinize and genuinely consider the evidence that allegedly supports the 
charges against them. The 6th Amendment guarantees a defendant a “particular trial 
process” (Jonakait, 1992, p. 745) that is intended to check government power.
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Before 2005, the Guidelines were legally binding administrative policy. As a 
result o f two 6th Amendment challenges brought by offenders charged and 
sentenced for federal cocaine violations, the Guidelines were determined to be 
unconstitutional and parts of the SRA were severed in two landmark cases which 
resulted in the Guidelines being classified as advisory administrative sentencing 
policy.
In the United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, the Court determined 
that the Guidelines were in direct violation of the 6th Amendment guarantee to a fair 
trial. In 2005, the Court heard United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan. 
In United States v. Booker, Freddie Booker was arrested in Beloit, Wisconsin, for 
possession and distribution of cocaine. In violation o f 21 U.S.C., he was indicted 
for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine (Clary,
2005). Booker was found guilty o f both charges. The statute that he was convicted 
under required a minimum sentence o f 10 years in a federal penitentiary and could 
have amounted to a maximum sentence o f life in prison. At trial, the judge 
determined that he had obstructed justice and had possessed an additional 566 
grams of cocaine. Booker had 23 previous convictions. He believed that he should 
only serve a sentence for possessing the 92 grams o f cocaine presented to the jury. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Booker’s position 
regarding his sentence. The Appellate Court believed that the additional 566 grams 
of cocaine possession should have been presented to the jury. The court’s failure to 
present this evidence to the jury violated his 6th Amendment right to a trial by jury. 
The Appellate Court ruled that Booker must receive the sentence given by the jury
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or the additional evidence of cocaine possession must be presented to a jury in the 
form a special sentencing hearing. The Government appealed the Appellate Court’s 
decision and the Court decided that it would consider his case.
In United States v. Fanfan, Duncan Fanfan was arrested for selling cocaine to a 
government informant. He was in possession of 1.25 kilograms of cocaine powder 
and 281 grams o f cocaine base. In 2003, a federal grand jury indicted him for 
“conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams 
of cocaine” (Clary, 2005, p. 3). He was found guilty of both charges. He received 
additional points under the Guidelines system for being a leader of a criminal 
activity. Fanfan also had an extensive criminal history. The final tally resulted in 
him being eligible for a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months in prison. The 
government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government 
believed that the trial court had decided his case in error. The Court granted 
certiorari.
United States v. Booker and the United States v. Fanfan presented two issues of 
legal significance for the United States Supreme Court to consider. The first issue 
that would have to be considered by the Court was whether the 6th Amendment was 
violated when facts necessary for sentencing were presented under the Guidelines to
ththe judge rather than the jury. Second, if  the 6 Amendment was violated, were the 
Guidelines still valid (Clary, 2006)7
The Court came to the conclusion that the right to a trial by jury is necessary 
whenever a judge attempts to hand down a sentence that is based upon evidence 
that has not been presented to the jury or revealed by the defendant. During their
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deliberations, the Court also defined the term statutory maximum (Clary, 2006). 
Statutory maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may give a defendant based 
upon evidence that has been scrutinized by an impartial jury or revealed in 
testimony by the defendant.
The mandatory nature o f the Guidelines was also a matter of contention with the 
Court. It was the Court’s position that no 6th Amendment violation would take place 
if  the Guidelines were advisory. The selection of a sentencing range was consistent 
with the trial judge’s broad discretion to hand down a sentence to the defendant 
within the statutory range. The Court had established in earlier case law that the 
Guidelines carried the weight o f law. The Guidelines placed emphasis on the power 
of the judge to determine the upper sentencing ranges and usually diminished the 
jury’s findings of the initial facts found in most cases.
The government believed that the guidelines should not have to be presented to 
the jury. The solicitor general’s office challenged the Court and asserted that any 
Guideline provisions that were required to be presented to the Court would 
transform the Guidelines into something similar to a criminal code of conduct. This 
would grant the Commission unconstitutional legislative authority. The Court 
responded by asserting that it did not matter what the facts of the case were called. 
The facts must be presented to an impartial jury to avoid a 6th Amendment 
violation (Clary, 2006).
After determining that evidence must be presented to an impartial jury in order 
to avoid a 6th Amendment violation, the Court was obligated to insure that the SRA 
was in full compliance with the 6th Amendment. The Court came to the conclusion
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that they would have to “sever” (Clary, 2006, p. 8) or remove some provisions from 
the SRA and make the Guidelines advisory in order to insure that they were 
constitutional. The Court attempted to explain their reasoning. First, when the 
Congress drafted the SRA, the Guidelines were created to assist the judge with the 
task of sentencing. The jury was never expected to be a part of this Congressional 
plan. Congress did not intend to have the jury participate in determining “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant” .
Second, The Congress intended the Sentencing Guidelines to create a uniform 
system of sentencing based upon the offense. The federal district court judge must 
rely upon pre-sentence reports to obtain information regarding the offender’s 
conduct while the criminal act was being committed (Clary, 2006). Details 
regarding some aspects of offender conduct may not go to the jury, but conduct that 
is not part o f the formal adjudication process may be entered into the applicable 
guideline sentencing range.
thThe Court was concerned that adapting the 6 Amendment requirement to the 
SRA would make it possible for the sentencing judge to access information 
regarding the conduct of the defendant from the pre-sentence report, which would 
prohibit sentencing based upon the defendant’s conduct at the time that the crime 
was being committed. This would undermine the uniform nature of sentencing 
intended by the Congress (Clary, 2006).
Third, severing two portions of the Sentencing Guidelines would make
thadministering the sentencing policy much easier. The 6 Amendment holding
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determined by the Court in United States v. Booker would require sentencers, 
defense attorneys, and juries to consider that a crime had been committed as well as 
determining how a crime was committed (Clary, 2006). This kind of approach 
would make indictments and criminal testimony burdensome.
Fourth, any 6th Amendment requirement would distort the true meaning of the 
Congressional intent to promote a uniform system of sentencing under the 
sentencing guideline as it applies to plea bargains. The Guidelines allowed federal 
district court judges to assess plea bargains based upon the defendant’s conduct 
during the course of committing the crime (Clary, 2006). This would come from the 
pre-sentence report. In light of the 6th Amendment, the prosecutor would obtain a 
disproportionate amount of authority over the defendant’s sentence without 
moderating the sentencing judge. Under these circumstances, prosecutors would 
determine which defendant’s were deserving of more severe sentences and would 
charge them accordingly.
Finally, the Congress intended to initiate sentencing reform in order to make it
theasier to increase sentences rather than decrease them. The 6 Amendment 
requirement by the Court would make it difficult for federal district court judges to 
hand down stiffer penalties (Clary, 2006). Based upon these principles, the Court
thdecided that it would be disastrous to apply the 6 Amendment requirement to the 
Guidelines and came to the conclusion that parts of the Guidelines would have to be 
severed in order to make the SRA constitutional.
A second majority of the Court led by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O ’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsburg issued
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detailed opinions regarding the legal severance of particular provisions of the SRA 
in order to meet constitutional standards under the 6th Amendment. The majority 
decided to sever 18 U.S.C.A. 3553 (b) (1). This provision of the SRA made the 
Guidelines mandatory. By legally severing this part o f the SRA, along with 18 
U.S.C.A. 3742 (e), the federal sentencing guidelines became advisory instead of 
mandatory (Booker, 2006). The revised, advisory version of the SRA was redefined 
underl8 U.S.C. 3551 and 28 U.S.C. 991.These laws require a federal sentencing 
court to apply the guideline ranges, but it also allows the court to consider the 
sentence in conjunction with statutory concerns as deemed necessary according to 
each particular case.
Another constitutional challenge to the Guidelines presented to the federal courts 
was that the crack cocaine sentencing ranges recommended by the Guidelines were
thso disproportionate to the crime committed that it violated the 8 Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Essentially, punishment is 
retribution for an injustice. The goal o f retribution is to “punish individuals in 
relation to the scope of their offenses” (Brennan, 2004, p. 579). Retribution is 
known as strict proportionality. In its truest form, strict proportionality would 
require “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” The sentencing philosophy o f just 
dessert is based in retribution. Just dessert is also known as commensurate justice or 
distributive justice. The Guidelines are a modified just dessert system of sentencing. 
Distributive justice is a deserved punishment prescribed to an offender that is 
proportionate to the harm done to the victim as a result o f the offender committing 
the crime (Austin, 1979). Just dessert is a nontraditional approach to American
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jurisprudence. Traditionally, the goal of the American criminal justice system has 
been deterrence or rehabilitation. In the past, judges and juries have been expected 
to find the proper fit for the crime and its appropriate punishment, but taking into 
consideration the modified just dessert features within the Guidelines, the key to 
defining proper fit within the Guidelines sentencing structure is determining what 
sentencing principle(s) receives the most emphasis. In this particular instance, just 
dessert and the harm done to the victim take priority over deterrence and 
rehabilitation.
Since the Court applies many criminal law theories, in the form of prison 
sentences, strict proportionality is impossible to achieve through modem penology. 
One penological theory accepted by the Court is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism seeks 
to select the punishment that is most beneficial to society. It is ordinarily asserted 
by those who are attempting to cosset the public sector’s future goals. Three 
penological theories stem from utilitarianism: deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation (Brennan, 2004). Just dessert is a hybrid system of sentencing based 
in retribution and the principles of utilitarianism in the form of prison sentences.
The present day application and acceptance of the theory of utilitarianism within the 
federal criminal justice system makes this sentencing rationale an impractical 
solution to the crack cocaine problem. The question is, does the punishment benefit 
society or is it rendered to simply to cause unneeded pain and suffering, as well as 
undue cost? The United States Supreme Court stmggles with this question in two 
test cases regularly used by the federal courts to determine the constitutionality of 
cocaine related violations of the law.
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Solem v Helm (1983) is the test case that is being used by the Court to determine 
whether the Guideline’s crack cocaine sentencing ranges are rational and not 
disproportionate to the crime committed. In Solem v Helm, the Court sought to 
determine whether disproportionate criminal sentences for low-level repeat 
offenders would be considered a violation of the 8th Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and usual punishment. The defendant at the time, Helm, had written a 
bad check for $100. He had a series of six prior nonviolent offenses and was facing 
life in prison without the possibility of parole. During the Solem deliberations, the 
Court formulated a three prong test: (1) it should be determined whether the 
severity of the punishment fits the crime; (2) a comparison of the sentences to other 
penalties in the same jurisdiction for more severe violations of the law should be 
conducted; and (3) whether the punishment was similar to those handed down in 
other jurisdictions (Brennan, 2004). Based upon this criterion, the Court overturned 
his life sentence. (It is important to note that no chance for parole was a vital factor 
in this case). Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion for the Court. In his opinion, 
Powell wrote that the 8th Amendment protected nonviolent repeat offenders from 
“grossly disproportionate punishments” (Chemerinsky, 2003, p. 21). Since Helm’s 
crimes were petty and nonviolent in nature, the Court determined that a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole was grossly disproportionate to the crimes 
committed. Today, the Court applies the Solemn test to establish that federal crack 
cocaine sentences for low-level offenders may be harsh, but they are not grossly 
disproportionate and are not considered to be cruel and unusual punishment under 
the 8th Amendment. They are not considered to be a violation of the 8th Amendment
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because most offenders are eligible for parole and possession or distribution of 
crack cocaine is not considered to be a petty offense (Haude, 1996).
Another test case that is used by the Court to weigh the proportionate value of 
crack cocaine sentencing ranges is Harmelin v. Michigan (1991). In the Harmelin 
case, a Michigan court sentenced Ronald Harmelin to life in prison for possessing 
more than 650 grams of cocaine (Brennan, 2004). The U.S. Supreme Court was 
reviewing Michigan’s new anti-drug law that mandated a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for possession of a controlled substance. During the Harmelin 
deliberations, Justice Kennedy used Solem to further expand upon the 8th 
Amendment’s proportionality principles: (1) legal, historical precedent asserts that 
the legislative branch is responsible for the length’s of prison terms; (2) the 8th 
Amendment does not require the application of any one penological system of 
criminal sentencing; (3) the recognition of the benefits of federalism, diverse 
interests, and law enforcement requirements within each state; and (4) a 
proportionality review should be conducted by considering objective factors. In the 
Harmelin case, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. In the majority
thopinion, he wrote that “the 8 Amendment does not require strict proportionality 
between crime and sentence” (Chemerinsky, 2003, p. 21). He expressed that the 8th 
Amendment prohibits only severe sentences that are “grossly disproportionate to 
the crime.”
Based upon the large amount of drugs possessed by Harmelin, the State of 
Michigan’s interest in controlling cocaine trafficking, and Kennedy’s position that 
the 8th Amendment does not endorse any one penological philosophy, the Court
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reaffirmed Harmelin’s conviction for cocaine trafficking. Justice Kennedy also 
asserted that the principles of proportionality established in Solem should not be 
activated until the threshold of gross proportionality had been met (Brennan, 2004). 
Four dissenting Justices felt that Kennedy’s gross proportionality standard was too 
restrictive as a constitutional standard of law. Probably the most important issue in 
the Harmelin case was Kennedy’s willingness to assert that federalism and
tilexcessive deference to the Congress were deciding factors in 8 Amendment cases. 
Protecting the diverse penological interests of the states and yielding excessive 
deference to the legislative branch in 8th Amendment cases left the awesome power 
of the Congress completely unchecked.
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Chapter 8 
Controlling for Legal Factors
This is a qualitative study. In this study, Professor David B. Mustard (2001), 
Professor Rodney L. Engen, and Professor Engen’s colleague, Professor Randy R. 
Gainey, apply two different methods of controlling for racial, ethnic, and gender 
disparity in determinate sentencing. Engen and Gainey (2000) assert that previous 
standard regression studies in determinate sentencing, similar to the one conducted 
by Professor Mustard, have failed to properly control for legal factors, such as the 
seriousness of the offense and criminal history. In addition to failing to properly 
control for offense seriousness and criminal history, Engen and Gainey also believe 
that Mustard has failed to take into consideration the effects of mandatory minimum 
sentences on the Guidelines and sentencing disparity. Engen and Gainey assert that 
once the effects of mandatory minimum sentences are properly considered, 
standard, linear additive regression models are found to be ill suited for presumptive 
sentencing grids, and this type of erroneous methodology will inevitably result in 
biased legal and extralegal factors as they relate to racial, ethnic, and gender based 
sentencing disparity. Engen and Gainey also believe that controlling properly for 
legal factors (offense seriousness x criminal history score) within a determinate 
sentencing framework will increase the variance in the study and will decrease 
extralegal factors.
The Commission is responsible for creating the rules for offenders who are 
sentenced in federal courts. The Commission is also responsible for promulgating
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these standards to the various federal courts. Data about the individual’s criminal 
record determines the offense level and criminal history scores, which indicates the 
sentencing range for each offense. If there are extenuating circumstances, the judge 
can depart from the Guidelines and issue a sentence that exceeds the maximum or is 
less than a minimum sentence (Mustard, 2001). When a departure is made, the 
reasons for it must be stated by the presiding judge.
The Commission’s data contains socioeconomic and demographic descriptions 
o f the offenders. Racial, ethnic, gender, and citizenship disparity are also prevalent 
within the Guidelines (Mustard, 2001). Disparity is defined by comparing two 
offenders who are in the same district court and committed the same offense. 
Disparity would also include the same criminal history and offense level as another 
offender, resulting in different sentences on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender.
In an article entitled, “Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts,” David B. Mustard (2001), a professor of 
Law and Economics at the University of Georgia, asserts that blacks, and Hispanics, 
and others received 5.5, 4.5, and 2.3 months longer in sentencing under the 
Guidelines than whites. He also asserts that females received 5.5 fewer months than 
males. The average sentence length is 46 months. After evaluating this figure in 
relationship to the mean, blacks receive about 12 % longer terms than whites. Males 
receive 12 % longer terms than females.
Mustard (2001) also comes to the conclusion that racial and gender disparities 
are correlated with race such as income, age, family ties, and employment. The 
Guidelines state that these factors should not affect the sentence length o f offenders,
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but offenders who did not graduate from high school appear to have received longer 
sentences. Those offenders who held college degrees appear to have received 
shorter sentences than high school graduates. Those offenders who did not receive a 
high school diploma received a sentence that was 1.2 months longer.
Mustard (2001) concluded in his study that income impacted the length of 
sentences given to offenders under the Guidelines. Offenders with income less than 
$5, 000 a year received the harshest sentences. Offenders at this income level 
received 6.2 months longer then people who had incomes between $25,000 and 
$35, 000. Those who are U.S. citizens received shorter sentences by about 1.7 
months. He concluded that U.S. citizens are mindful o f their rights and possess a 
greater knowledge o f the court system. Age is also positively related to sentence 
length.
The greatest disparity under the Guidelines is for drug trafficking. According to 
Mustard (2001), “about 2/3 of the black-white disparity for drug trafficking is 
accounted for by departures from the guidelines” (p. 301). The sentencing disparity 
for drug traffickers is greatest when comparing Hispanics and white offenders. 
According to the study published by Mustard in 2001, the average sentence for drug 
trafficking is 24.5 months. The percentage difference is greatest for those convicted 
of drug trafficking. For the crime of drug trafficking, blacks received 13.7 % longer 
sentences than whites. Hispanics received sentences that were 6.1 months longer 
than whites. This amounts to 8 % difference in sentencing between these two 
groups.
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Mustard (2001) conducts a linear regression analysis controlling for 
criminological factors, but also controls for extralegal variables that are 
“demographic, and socioeconomic” (p. 295) in nature. In his study, Mustard 
examines 77, 236 federal offenders sentenced under the SRA. This data was drawn 
from 120, 336 cases that met certain requirements set by the Commission. The 
sentencing dates were from October 1, 1991, to September 30, 1994. The criminal 
offenses analyzed in this section all took place after November, 1987, the effective 
date of the new SRA legislation. None of these particular offenses are categorized 
as petty offenses.
Cases were selected in the following manner: First, offenders given a life 
sentence and time served were not made a part of this study because a sentence 
length cannot be determined from these two categories. Excluding these categories 
of offenders from the sample dropped 740 offenders, leaving 119, 596 offenders to 
be considered. Second, individuals with incomplete criminal records (lack of 
offense level, criminal history, and months of imprisonment) were dropped from the 
sample, which removed an additional 11, 671 and retained 107, 925 (Mustard, 
2001). This group incorporated those who were charged on multiple offense levels, 
including criminal history points, and those who were listed as being sentenced 
under special rules. Third, all offenders who did not have information that clearly 
defined their race, gender, or ethnicity were removed from the sample, which 
dropped an additional 946 and retained a total of 106, 979. Finally, those who 
lacked specific details regarding income, education, citizenship, age, and the 
number of dependents were eliminated from the study.
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Mustard’s (2001) study asserts that large disparities exist in the average sentence 
length on the basis of race, gender, and ethnicity. Whites received the lowest 
average sentence of 32.1 months. Hispanics receive a sentence of 54.1 months and 
blacks receive 64.1 months. This is 68. 5 % and 99.6 % larger than the average 
sentences for whites. The difference between males and females is even a larger 
gap. The average sentence for males 278.4 % greater than that of females (this 
amounts to 51.5 months in comparison to 18.5 months). The average offense level 
for blacks is 22.8 % higher than the offense level for whites, and blacks have an 
average criminal history score of 30.9 % greater than the white average. The men’s 
average offense level and criminal history are 39.6 % and 53.3 % greater than those 
of females.
There are disparities when taking into consideration average sentence lengths, 
but because they do not correct for offense level or criminal history, criminological 
variables may give some answers regarding these disparities (Mustard, 2001). To 
control for the offense level and criminal history, dummy variables are included for 
each cell in the sentencing table.
The offense controls help to remove bias from the experiment. Some offenses 
may be given more severe sentences, even if  the score and criminal history are 
identical for another crime. If members of a specific group are overrepresented in 
regards to specific crimes, and the particular violation category is not controlled for, 
it will distort the results by giving the false impression that that these groups are 
being sentenced in a more discordant manner, even after taking the appropriate 
steps to control for criminological variables (Mustard, 2001).
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Mustard (2001) determined that blacks and Hispanics are less likely to receive 
no prison time than whites. He also determined that those who are not U.S. citizens 
are less likely to receive no prison time than those who are citizens. Those with 
incomes of less than $5, 000 annually are less likely to receive no prison time. The 
greater an offender’s criminal history and offense level, the lower the probability 
that he will be assigned no prison time.
Mustard (2001) also came to the conclusion that there were differences in the 
probability of offenders receiving Guideline departures. Departure cases constitute 
more than half of the total sentencing differences. Examining these departures is a 
vital step in analyzing sentencing disparity. He determined that blacks, males, and 
Hispanics, and those with little education and income were less likely to receive 
downward and more likely to receive harsher upward departures from the presiding 
judges in comparison to white offenders. Females are more likely than males to 
receive downward departures.
There are also differences in the size of the adjustments for those who were 
given departures. “The downward adjustments are calculated by subtracting the 
actual sentence from the minimum sentence. Upward departures are calculated by 
subtracting the maximum sentence from the actual sentence” (p. 30). According to 
Mustard (2001), conditioned upon downward departures and controlling for offense 
level and criminal history, blacks, Hispanics, and others received downward 
departures 5.7, 5.6, and 5.0 months less than whites. Females received downward 
departures 6.9 months larger than males. When socioeconomic variables are 
considered, the sentencing disparities for blacks, Hispanics and other offenders.
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Once again, Mustard’s (2001) study considers the race, ethnicity, and gender of 
the individual sentenced in the same federal district court, with the same offense, 
criminal history, and offense level as another person. He concludes that large 
disparities in sentencing exist on the basis of race, gender, education, income, and 
citizenship. Over half of these disparities in sentencing are due to departures from 
the Guidelines rather than simply different interpretations of federal statutes. Racial 
and gender disparities exist for drug trafficking. A greater portion of the disparity 
between Hispanic offenders and white offenders is apparent in firearms possession 
and drug trafficking. The educational disparity is most apparent when analyzing 
drug trafficking, but is not statistically significant for other offenses.
Mustard (2001) has also concluded in his study that racial, gender, income, and 
education disparities are apparent in other areas of the Guidelines. Blacks and males 
are less likely to receive no prison time. Blacks and males are also more likely to 
receive upward departures and less likely to receive downward departures. When 
downward departures are actually given, blacks and males receive less 
consideration than whites and females in this area as well. Low income offenders 
are more prone to receive upward departures. Low income offenders also receive 
very small adjustments even when they receive downward departures. Highly 
educated offenders are more likely to receive larger downward departures than high 
school graduates. Being a U.S. citizen is helpful under all conditions.
The Commission asserts that the gap between majority and minority offenders is 
due to legally relevant differences among individual group members regarding the 
crime committed and individual criminal history {Fifteen Years, 2004). There are
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three different explanations for the gap between black, Hispanic and other 
offenders. First, fair differentiation is when offenders receive different treatment 
based upon legally relevant characteristics needed to achieve the purposes of 
sentencing. The second possible explanation for the gap in sentencing between 
black, Hispanic and other offenders is due to discrimination. Discrimination is when 
offenders receive different treatment based on their race, ethnicity, gender, or other 
forbidden factors. Finally, the third explanation for gaps in sentencing between 
offenders is unsupportable adverse impact. Unsupportable adverse impact is when 
an offender receives different treatment based upon sentencing rules that are not 
clearly needed to achieve the purpose of sentencing.
In his study, Mustard (2001) asserts that sentencing disparity for drug crimes 
under the Guidelines is due to discrimination and that the relationship between 
offense level and sentence length for minority offenders has a nonlinear relationship 
{Fifteen Years, 2004). Once again, Mustard controls for the legally relevant factors 
o f offense level and criminal history, but the disparity in his study results from 
applying principals of standard regression analysis and incorrectly assuming linear, 
additive relationships between legally relevant factors and sentencing length. 
Mustard also incorrectly controls for extra-legal variables of demographic and 
socioeconomic factors and fails to take into consideration that mandatory 
minimums often prevail over the Guideline sentencing ranges in some cases.
Failure to properly consider the effects of mandatory minimum sentences on the 
Guidelines sentencing ranges will lead to racial and ethnic embellishments. Mustard 
asserts that a nonlinear relationship is found in his regression analysis by using
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demographic and socioeconomic factors and asserts that this is proof that the 
Guidelines are creating racial, ethnic, and gender sentencing disparities for 
minorities when compared to white offenders. Mustard determined through his 
research that this is especially true for black and Hispanic males.
Paul Hofer and Kevin Blackwell (2000) conducted a study regarding the effect 
that mandatory minimum statutes have on the Guidelines. Hofer and Blackwell 
assert that mandatory minimums often prevail over the Guideline ranges in some 
cases and failure to properly consider this effect will lead to “exaggerated race and 
ethnic effects” (Fifteen Years, 2004, p. 119). For example, penalties under a 
mandatory minimum statute have no effect in cases where the Guidelines range is 
greater than the minimum penalty, but in other cases, the mandatory minimum 
penalty “trumps” the Guideline range and forces judges to mete out higher 
penalties. In a standard regression equation, like the study conducted by Mustard, a 
variable indicating the involvement of a mandatory minimum penalty will greatly 
“misspecify” the results of these important legal differences among offenders. 
Because mandatory minimums are associated with penalties for crack cocaine, and 
crack is a drug sold in urban areas where a disproportionate number of minorities 
reside and are often charged for the sale and possession of this substance, failure to 
recognize this important legal matter will give a false impression that racial, ethnic, 
and gender disparities are present.
A noteworthy amount of the gap between black and other offenders is attributed 
to the adverse impact of mandatory minimum anti-drug laws. In 1991, mandatory 
minimum sentences were a popular way for the Congress to demonstrate to the
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voting public that they are willing to get tough on crime (Breyer, 1999). Mandatory 
minimum sentences were seldom used in U.S. history until the Congress created 
100 separate mandatory minimum provisions in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Gun 
and drug statutes consisted of 44 % of all Guidelines cases.
From the beginning, the Commission has always opposed mandatory minimum 
sentences. Many of the country’s legal scholars, lawyers, and judges believe that 
mandatory minimum sentences are imprudent and unjust (Breyer, 1999). Mandatory 
minimums upset the uniform balance in sentencing that the Guidelines were meant 
to establish. Statutory mandatory minimum sentences prevent the Commission from 
carrying out the congressionally mandated task of creating a uniform set of 
punishments. Mandatory minimums make it impossible for the Commission to 
consider the amount of cocaine involved in any particular case and to adjust the 
sentence accordingly. Mandatory minimums also make it difficult for the 
Commission to take into consideration the minimal role an offender may have 
played in a drug case. The Congress rarely considers exceptional drug cases like 
these, and the blanket provisions that were created on the floor of the House and 
Senate later tied the hands of the Commission in the courtroom.
Mandatory minimum sentences are often circumvented by federal prosecutors. 
Mandatory minimum sentences appear to have failed in achieving the goals of 
lengthy and uniform prison sentences (Breyer, 1999). In 1991, a study by the 
Commission determined that in nearly 40 % of the cases involving a crime where a 
mandatory minimum sentence was obligatory, the offender received a sentence 
lower than the mandatory minimum statute. This stems from the prosecutor having
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to create a safety valve for unusual cases. For example, federal prosecutors may 
agree to a substantial assistance departures in order to use those offenders who have 
minimal involvement in cases to convict those who have had a more substantial 
involvement in cocaine trafficking. Mandatory minimum defendants received 
downward departures 21.6 % of the time compared to 14.4 % downward departure 
rate for the general offender population. The Congress is asking for Guideline 
sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing at the same time. These are simply 
two opposing forces that are pulling in opposite directions and undermining the 
goal of fair, coherent, and uniform federal sentencing reform.
In 1994, the Congress enacted a safety valve to give first time nonviolent drug 
offenders relief from excessively harsh mandatory minimum sentences. This safety 
valve is an inadequate response to the Guidelines controversy and mandatory 
minimum sentences must be appropriately integrated into the new Guidelines by the 
Congress or be eliminated.
In their study entitled, “Modeling the Effects of Relevant and Extralegal Factors 
under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed,” Rodney L. Engen and 
Rodney R. Gainey (2000) apply new linear regression methodology. They believe 
that racial, gender, and ethnic disparity present in determinate sentencing is due to 
fair differentiation. Fair differentiation is when offenders receive different treatment 
based upon legally relevant characteristics needed to achieve the purposes of 
sentencing.
According to Engen and Gainey (2000), when conducting linear regression on 
Guidelines data, researchers should include the legally relevant factors of offense
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seriousness and the offender’s criminal history score as it is defined by the 
Guidelines, along with offender characteristics and other factors. Studies using this 
data have found that offense seriousness and prior offenses determine the type of 
sentence and sentencing length. These legally relevant factors explain 50 % and 60 
% of the variance in sentencing length. Most of the studies on the Guidelines have 
also determined that race, sex, and other social factors effect sentencing outcomes, 
but these effects appear to be rather small when compared with legally relevant 
factors.
Engen and Gainey (2000) assert that most studies have not controlled fully for 
the effects o f offense seriousness and criminal history (seriousness x criminal 
history score) on sentencing outcomes. Most studies predicting sentencing length 
under the Guidelines are not accurate because they incorrectly assume linear, 
additive or unchanged relationship between legally relevant factors and sentencing 
length. Ordinarily, regression models assume a uniform change in the dependent 
variable with each unit increase of the independent variable, but Guidelines 
typically increase the severity of the variables radically for more serious offenses, 
including offenders with drug and weapons related criminal histories. The 
combined influence o f offense seriousness and criminal history is not additive. The 
impact that prior offenses have on the Guidelines is based upon the seriousness of 
the current offense being considered by the judge, and it increases as offense 
seriousness increases. In other words, the effects o f legally relevant factors like 
offense seriousness and criminal history are nonlinear. Since there is interaction 
between offense seriousness and criminal history present in any system of
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determinate sentencing, including the Guidelines, linear regression models that 
assume linear, additive relationships between seriousness, criminal history, and 
sentence length are “misspecified” (p. 1209).
Social science methodology that applies standard linear, additive regression to 
determinate sentencing grids do not accurately account for the interaction between 
the legal factors of offense seriousness and criminal history. As a result o f this 
imprecise methodology, legal factors are profoundly underestimated within the 
determinate sentencing process and the factors of gender and race are significantly 
distorted. When taking into consideration the legal factors of offense seriousness 
and criminal history, the legal factors account for 80 % of the variance in the study 
(Engen & Gainey, 2000). The standard linear regression model only accounts for 
51% of the variance in the study.
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Chapter 9
The Second Coming o f Sentencing Reform
After years of controversy over federal cocaine sentencing, the Commission 
bowed to pressure from academics, lawyers, judges, and minority rights advocates 
to make changes in cocaine based sentencing. On May 1, 2007, the Commission 
submitted to the Congress amendment 9, which makes changes to federal 
sentencing policy for cocaine based violations of the law. These changes are based 
upon 28 U.S.C 994 (a) and (p). Amendment 9 lowers the guideline sentencing range 
for certain categories of cocaine based offenses and offenders (Retroactive Report, 
2007). Amendment 9 will become effective on November 1, 2007, unless the 
Congress feels that it is necessary to make further changes in this sentencing policy.
The new crack cocaine amendment formulated by the Commission and 
presented to the Congress adjusts downward by two levels the base offense level for 
each quantity level of crack cocaine. These quantity levels are listed in the 
Guidelines Drug Quantity Table 2D 1.1. The Drug Quantity Table deals with the 
unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or trafficking of crack cocaine. The 
Drug Quantity Table also applies to possession, distribution, and conspiracy 
{Retroactive Report, 2007). The amendment applies to crack cocaine base level 
offenses that correspond with Guideline ranges that include the statutory mandatory 
minimum penalties for cocaine base. For example, according to amendment 9, 5 
grams of cocaine base are assigned a base level offense 24. This amounts to 51 to 
63 months at Criminal History Category One (which includes the 60 month
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mandatory minimum penalty). The possession of 50 grams of cocaine is assigned a 
Guidelines base level offense of 30. This amounts to a sentence of 97 to 121 months 
at Criminal History Category One (which includes the 120 month mandatory 
minimum penalty). Amendment 9 will be applied retroactively.
In order to implement the provisions in amendment 9, the Commission 
promulgated sentencing guidelines rule IB 1.10. This sentencing policy addresses a 
reduction in sentencing due to the new amendment to the Guidelines (.Retroactive 
Report, 2007). Subsection (a) of 1B1.10 specifies when an 18 U.S.C 3582 (c) (2) 
reduction is authorized.
Analysis regarding the effect that amendment 9 will have retroactively on 
offenders sentenced for cocaine based violations was produced by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. The office of Research and Data (ORD) is the research 
arm of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. They estimated that 19,500 offenders 
sentenced between October 1, 1991 and June 30, 2007, would be eligible to seek a 
reduced sentence if  amendment 9 is implemented on November 1, 2007 
{Retroactive Report, 2007).
The ORD examined the federal government’s fiscal year from 1992 through the 
3rd quarter o f 2007. The Offenders that would be considered eligible under 
amendment 9 would be those that involved crack cocaine and were assessed at an 
offense level greater than 12. The base level offense of offenders eligible for 
sentence reduction under the new amendment should have no involvement in 
homicide (level 43). The quantity of the drugs found in the offender’s possession at 
the time of arrest must be less than 4, 500 grams.
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In order to include all offenders who were sentenced between fiscal year 1992 
and 2006, the ORD conducted a cross-reference study with the United States 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The ORD conducted a cross-reference study with the 
BOP to insure that those that were still incarcerated and eligible under the new 
amendment were properly considered for sentence reduction (Retroactive Report, 
2007). Some of the offenders who were being sentenced while the study was taking 
place had not been entered into the ORD or BOP data base. This will result in the 
total number of offenders being somewhat higher than was estimated in the study.
The ORD and the BOP were able to come to a conclusion based upon the 
number o f offenders who were sentenced before June 30, 2007. The ORD and the 
BOP determined that 31, 323 offenders (97.9 %) were eligible under the new 
amendment. Of these 31, 323 cases, the BOP were able to determine that 26, 383 
offenders (84.2 %) were still incarcerated (Retroactive Report, 2007). The 
remaining 4, 940 cases were former federal prisoners that were no longer 
incarcerated: due to expiration of their sentence (48.5 %); early release due to 
completion of a drug treatment program (22.5 %); poor record keeping on released 
offenders (22.9 %); release for reasons other than drug related policy issues (2.2 
%); and 3.9 % had died in custody.
In order to determine the total number of offenders sentenced under the drug 
guidelines the ORD and BOP tallied the total number of offenders sentenced under 
the Guidelines since 1992. The total number of offenders sentenced under the 
guidelines was 875, 368. Based upon the 875, 368 that were sentenced, 341, 338 
(39.0 %) were sentenced under the drug guidelines (Retroactive Report, 2007). Of
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the 341, 338 that were sentenced under the drug guidelines 75, 978 (22.3 %) 
involved crack cocaine. Taking into consideration the total number o f crack cases, 
26, 383 o f these cases met the standard under the new amendment for crack cocaine 
based sentence reduction. After the BOP was completed, the ORD removed and 
additional 4,914 offenders from the total number o f offenders sentenced under the 
crack cocaine guidelines due to career criminal and armed career criminal violations 
o f the law. This last calculation left the Commission with 21, 469 offenders that 
were eligible for sentence reduction under the crack cocaine guidelines.
The ORD also accumulated demographic information on the offenders that are 
eligible for sentence reduction. Due to missing data on 2, 824 offenders who appear 
to be eligible for sentence reduction under the new amendment, the actual number 
o f offenders who were analyzed in the ORD study was reduced to a final total of 19, 
500 {Retroactive Report, 2007). O f the 19, 500 offenders considered in the ORD 
study, 94.5 % were U.S citizens, 94.2 % were male, 5.8 % were white, 7.6 % were 
Hispanic, and 85.9 % were black offenders.
The average sentence reduction for those offenders who are eligible for sentence 
reduction under the new amendment is 27 months (from 152 to 125 months). 
According to the ORD study, 10, 605 offenders would receive a sentence reduction 
of 24 months (63.5 %) or less {Retroactive Report, 2007). The ORD study also 
indicates that 4, 776 (28.6 %) of offenders would be receiving a sentence reduction 
o f one year or less. Finally, the study indicates that 1,315 offenders (7.9 %) would 
receive a sentence reduction o f 49 months.
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With United States v. Booker and amendment 9, the federal criminal justice 
system continued to chip away at the legal, structural causes of minority sentencing 
disparity by hearing Kimbrough v. United States. On December 10, 2007, The 
Court upheld the federal district court’s discretion when imposing prison sentences 
for crack cocaine related offenses in Kimbrough v United States (Kimbrough,
2007). The Court used its’ decision in United States v Booker to further clarify the 
rapidly changing federal sentencing philosophy concerning crack cocaine violations 
o f federal law.
In September 2004, Derrick Kimbrough was indicted in the United States 
District Court o f the Eastern District of Virginia and charged with distribution of 
cocaine and possession o f a firearm {Kimbrough, 2007). He pled guilty to these 
charges. The Guidelines determined that he should serve 19 to 22.5 years in prison 
for possession of crack cocaine and a firearm. Instead of receiving the sentence 
outlined by the Guidelines, Kimbrough received a sentence o f 15 years to life. The 
district court determined that a sentence of more than 15 years would have been a 
greater penalty than was required to accomplish the purpose of sentencing as it is 
outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3553 (a).
The majority of the Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, determined that 
Kimbrough’s case was a prime example of the disparity in sentencing between 
crack and powder cocaine. Kimbrough possessed both powder and crack cocaine.
If he had only possessed powder cocaine, his Guideline Sentence would have been 
between 8 and 9 years. The District Court decided that the statutory minimum 
sentence of 15 years was sufficient to accomplish the federal criminal justice
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system’s goals (Kimbrough, 2007). The Fourth Circuit vacated Kimbrough’s 
sentence because they felt that handing down a decision outside the Guidelines was 
unreasonable and only served to further create controversy and confusion within the 
federal court system. The Court granted certiorari in order to examine the 
Kimbrough case and its’ relationship to United States v. Booker.
One issue examined by the Court was the chemical elements of crack cocaine 
and powder cocaine. It has already been discussed in this study that crack and 
powder cocaine are similar in their content, but what is most significant regarding 
crack and powder cocaine is the issues raised by the Court regarding the manner in 
which these two drugs are consumed. In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg writes that 
while the two drugs are similar in physical chemical make-up, they are used in very 
different ways. She wrote “smoking crack cocaine allows the body to absorb the 
drug much faster than inhaling powder cocaine, and thus produces a shorter more 
intense high” (.Kimbrough, 2007, p.6).
Another important issue addressed by Justice Ginsburg in her majority opinion 
was the impact o f the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 upon sentencing disparity. 
According to Ginsburg, when the Congress Drafted the 1986 Act they felt that 
crack cocaine was an inexpensive, yet potent street drug, that was highly addictive, 
promoted violence, and created birth defects. Once the Congress established that 
crack cocaine was much more dangerous than powder cocaine, they used the Anti- 
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, based upon the weight of the cocaine ceased, to determine 
whether the defendant was a “major drug dealer or a serious trafficker”
(Kimbrough, 2007, p. 6). In the process of identifying major drug dealers and
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serious traffickers, the Congress further applied the Act to create a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 years for major drug dealers and a 5 year mandatory 
minimum for serious traffickers. It is within this political climate, Justice Ginsburg 
asserts in her Kimbrough decision, that the crack and powder cocaine disparity was 
created. Ginsburg discusses the adaptation of the 100:1 ratio that treated every gram 
of crack cocaine as being equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. The 5 year 
mandatory minimum applies to those offenders who are caught with 5 grams of 
crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine. The 10 year mandatory sentence 
contained within the Act applies to those defendant’s who are caught with 50 grams 
of crack cocaine or 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.
Instead of using past sentencing practices for drug trafficking offenses, as was 
done for other offenses, the Commission failed to apply research to drug trafficking 
offenses when formulating the Guidelines. According to the majority opinion of the 
Court, the Commission decided to base the drug trafficking sentences upon the 
weight of the illegal substance confiscated by federal law enforcement officials. 
Instead of relying upon the historical, legal precedent of past sentencing practices, 
the Commission “adjusted and modified” {Kimbrough, 2007, p. 7) the past 
sentencing scheme based upon instructions from the Congress to place more 
emphasis on rationality and proportionality as it related to drug charges. In other 
words, drug offenses were formulated differently under the Guidelines than 
penalties for other federal crimes. In the Kimbrough decision, Justice Ginsburg 
made it clear that this modified approach to drug sentencing combined with the 
Commission’s weighted drug quantity table was excessive.
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Beginning in 2002, the Commission issued reports that challenged the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine offenses. According to Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion in the Kimbrough case, the Commission determined that there were 
problems with the crack and powder cocaine disparity. In the Kimbrough decision, 
first, Justice Ginsburg believed that the relative harmful nature of the drug and the 
violence that was allegedly associated with it could no longer be supported with 
empirical evidence. Second, she wrote that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were 
unfairly targeting low-level street dealers and failing to arrest and punish major 
drug dealers. (Major drug dealers usually deal in powder cocaine, while street level 
dealers usually breakdown powder cocaine into crack cocaine). Finally, according 
to Justice Ginsburg, the Commission came to the conclusion that the 100:1 cocaine 
standard undermined the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system, since 
many legal scholars and law enforcement officials maintain the perception that the 
Guidelines create racial sentencing disparity {Kimbrough, 2007). Though the Court 
revealed that the Commission still felt that crack cocaine sentencing disparity was 
warranted because of the addictive nature of the drug and the weapons and violence 
associated with it, the Court, as well as the Commission believed that the 100:1 
ratio was still somewhat excessive and that a reduction in sentencing disparity was 
necessary. As a result o f these factors, the Court determined that Kimbrough’s 4.5 
year sentence reduction was not an abuse of the judicial discretion allegedly 
committed by the District Court.
Influenced by the Court’s decision in the Kimbrough case the previous day, on 
December 11, 2007, the Commission voted to give retroactive effect to amendment
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9. Amendment 9 to the Guidelines would reduce penalties for crack cocaine 
offenses retroactively. Retroactivity o f the crack cocaine amendment went into 
effect on March 3, 2008, but not every offender will be eligible for a sentence 
reduction under this new rule. The Commission has implemented a review process 
that will allow federal judges to evaluate each particular offender and consider their 
potential threat to the public {Retroactive Report, 2007). If the reviewing judge 
considers the offender to be a potential danger to the community, they will not be 
eligible for sentence reduction under the retroactive rule. This process will be 
carried out over a 30 year period because many of the offenders will still be 
required to serve mandatory minimum sentences of 5 and 10 years due to the 
amount of crack cocaine involved in their original drug offense.
On November 1, 2007, amendment 9 to the Guidelines designed to reduce 
sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses were 
implemented. This new amendment took effect after a 6 month Congressional 
review regarding the controversy surrounding federal sentencing for crack cocaine 
offenses. Authorization by the Commission for a reduction in sentencing for certain 
classes of offenses and offenders are authorized by the SRA {Retroactive, 2007).
The Commission decided to make the new crack cocaine amendment retroactive 
after considering commentary from stakeholders within the criminal justice system. 
Approximately 33, 000 letters were received by the Commission and a full day of 
hearings were held on the proposed retroactive action. Most prominent stakeholders 
within the federal criminal justice supported retroactivity {Retroactive, 2007). The 
Commission considered any burden that would have been placed on the federal
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court system and any public safety issues surrounding the action. Based upon the 
information obtained through commentary, hearings, and testimony, the 
Commission decided that retroactivity was the best statutory solution to the issue of 
crack cocaine sentencing disparity. The Commission reminded the federal judiciary 
that this was a limited action and when considering each individual case, public 
safety was to be the primary concern.
The original amendment initiating a reduction in crack cocaine sentencing and 
the retroactivity that has followed are the first 2 steps in reducing the disparity 
between powder and crack cocaine sentencing. The Commission continues to look 
to the Congress to resolve the 100:1 cocaine sentencing standard that is the source 
of controversy surrounding federal cocaine sentencing. It is left to the Congress to 
take the last step in resolving powder and crack cocaine disparity (Retroactive, 
2007).
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Chapter 10
The Crack Cocaine Controversy: The Individual v. Community
As a result of making amendment 9 retroactive, a debate has ensued within the 
federal criminal justice system regarding the affect that the release o f 19,000 
inmates over the next 30 years will have on communities across the United States.
In a segment of the McNeil/Lehrer News Hour, hosted by PBS correspondent 
Jeffrey Brown (2007), Judge Reggie Walton and U.S. Prosecutor Gretchen Shappert 
debated the crack cocaine controversy. Judge Reggie Walton, an active federal 
judge on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, believes that 
more emphasis should be placed on the rights of the offenders. Gretchen Shappert, 
an active U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina, believes that the 
potentially negative affect on communities should carry more weight when 
considering the fate of crack cocaine offenders.
Walton believes that the willingness of the Commission to address the disparity 
between powder cocaine and crack cocaine with the new amendment confirms that 
the disparity in sentencing between these two substances unfairly targets black 
males. He believes that many minorities live in poor neighborhoods and there are 
socioeconomic reasons for the disproportionate number of black males associated 
with crack cocaine arrests (Brown, 2007). Walton asserts that crack is cheap and 
that it is often sold in disadvantaged minority neighborhoods. He believes that as a 
result o f the socioeconomic underpinnings of crack cocaine enforcement, 86 % of 
those who are serving time in federal prison for crack cocaine violations are black.
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Walton also expressed his opinion regarding the specifics surrounding the 
retroactive action of amendment 9. He believes that the crack amendment should be 
retroactive because applying the amendment in any other manner would amount to 
petty legal wrangling over deadlines and fundamental fairness in sentencing 
(Brown, 2007). For example, the rule would not apply to those who were sentenced 
on October 31st, but those who were sentenced on November 1st would benefit from 
the new amendment.
Shappert believes that applying the crack cocaine amendment in a retroactive 
manner will have a devastating affect on communities all over the United States.
She asserts that U.S. Attorney General Mukasey spoke out against the crack cocaine 
amendment, and the Justice Department did not want this rule applied retroactively. 
Shappert believes that crack cocaine is associated with violence and that the 19, 000 
offenders that are eligible for resentencing will greatly increase the crime rate while 
ravaging communities (Brown, 2007). The 19,000 offenders in question represent 
10 % of the federal prison population. She asserts that this 10 % is actually a very 
unique element within the U.S. prison population. Studies conducted by the 
Sentencing Commission regarding this 10 % demonstrate that those convicted in the 
federal criminal justice system for crack cocaine violations are more likely to be 
recidivist based upon their criminal histories. Shappert believes that the willingness 
of these offenders to act as leaders in drug organizations is a disturbing factor that 
supports her position.
Shappert is concerned about the effect the retroactive amendment will have on 
the courts and the communities. She asserts that the new retroactive application of
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the amendment will pack federal courts with these retroactive cases and will place 
and undue burden on federal judges. She also believes that as a result o f the 
retroactive action, offenders will be released from the federal prison system and 
allowed to commit additional crimes in fragile communities that have already been 
ravaged by crack cocaine and the violence that is associated with this form of the 
drug. The BOP claims that it takes approximately 30 months to prepare a federal 
inmate to be returned back into the community after they have been incarcerated for 
a long period of time. Inmates in the federal prison system receive 450 hours of 
training in BOP programs, such as anger management and drug counseling. They 
may also earn degrees or obtain jobs within the prison that will give them skills that 
may be used upon release (Brown, 2007). Shappert asserts that releasing these 
offenders prematurely before they have benefited from the social services and 
programs offered by the BOP will have a negative impact on communities. She also 
asserts that 2, 500 offenders with a history of crack cocaine violations will be 
placed back into their communities within the 1st year of the retroactive action, and 
they will be returning back to communities that are still coping with a number of 
drug epidemics. Shappert believes that cocaine destroys and individual, but crack 
cocaine destroys a community.
Walton believes that the issue of recidivism can be addressed through judicial 
case review on an individual basis. He does not believe that potentially violent 
offenders should benefit from the retroactive action and career criminals should not 
receive a get out of jail free card (Brown, 2007). Walton is attempting to make the 
public aware that there are individuals who are incarcerated for crack cocaine
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violations that are not violent career criminals. He asserts that federal judges will 
consider the potential danger of each individual offender and will apply the review 
process established by the Commission in a just and responsible manner.
Shappert believes that the review process established by the Sentencing 
Commission may not be properly carried out in an efficient and just manner. She 
asserts that the convictions obtained by the Department of Justice are valid and the 
large number of the cases being reviewed will lessen the opportunity forjudges to 
make sound legal decisions in a great number o f the cases (Brown, 2007). She also 
asserts that cases will have to be reopened in situations where agents have retired, 
prosecutors may have taken employment elsewhere, and files may be missing or 
destroyed. These are issues that will directly affect the efficiency of the judicial 
review process.
Walton believes that the retroactive action taken by the Sentencing Commission 
is just because many of the sentences are simply too harsh. He asserts that federal 
judges should take on the extra workload to insure equity in federal sentencing 
(Brown, 2007). Walton sees no point in warehousing nonviolent federal prisoners 
for inordinate periods of time at a cost to the American taxpayer of $24, 000 a year. 
He believes that instead of burdening tax payers, some of the nonviolent crack 
offenders could be released and could eventually become productive members of 
society.
Walton asserts that the current state of federal law as it relates to crack cocaine 
sentencing is having a demoralizing affect on minority communities. He expressed 
his concern that potential jurors are hesitant to serve jury duty and those jurors who
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do actually serve when they are called are reluctant to convict defendants who are 
standing trial for crack cocaine violations because they believe that the sentencing 
disparity is egregiously unfair (Brown, 2007). Walton asserts that this apparent 
disparity also affects the police and their ability to secure witnesses and information 
on crack cocaine cases in the black community. He believes the black community 
has lost respect for the criminal justice system.
It is Shappert’s position that these convictions are not based upon race. She 
asserts that the federal criminal justice system does not use race to hand down 
excessively harsh sentences to black offenders for crack cocaine violations of the 
law. For example, Shappert claims that those who are arrested for 
methamphetamine and liquid methamphetamine are predominantly Hispanic or 
white. She also asserts that the federal criminal justice system “charges based upon 
criminal conduct, not based upon race” (Brown, 2007). Shappert claims that 
mandatory minimum sentences were passed, based upon the law and order 
necessity seen by the Congress, at the time that the powder and crack cocaine 
disparity issue was being considered. It is the Department of Justice’s job to uphold 
the laws as they were passed by the Congress.
The appearance that the Guidelines may unfairly target minorities has been a 
large part o f the powder and crack cocaine controversy for years. Legals 
professionals, like Walton, as well as legal scholars like Mustard and Albonetti, 
believe that the 100:1 cocaine standard is racially discriminatory and may be 
considered a violation of the equal protection guarantees under the Constitution. In 
his essay, “Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,” David Slansky (1995), a law
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professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, writes that when race is 
taken into consideration, the American criminal justice system sees what it wants to 
see. In a series o f race related crack cocaine cases that appear to be mysteriously 
uniform in their language and reasoning, Slansky asserts that the Court has created 
a legal doctrine that refuses to properly consider race and cocaine sentencing. He 
writes in his essay that the rule established by the Court directed the lower courts to 
conduct a rational basis enquiry when assessing crack cocaine sentences unless the 
statute in question reveals “an out-and-out-racial animus- an affirmative desire to 
hurt blacks” (p. 1303). None o f the federal drug statues demonstrate such overt 
racism. Slansky explains that the Court further instructed the lower courts to ask 
whether the Congress pursued a legitimate goal of curbing drug abuse. If 
classifications formulated by the Congress are related to achieving this goal, the 
courts may only conduct a rational basis review of the Guidelines based upon 
sentencing philosophy alone.
The possession, use, and distribution of crack cocaine have had a devastating 
effect on the community. The large sums of quick money obtained through crack 
cocaine distribution places a low value on the conventional ways of making a 
living. Labor and fast food jobs are seen to be a waste of time and many who are 
engaged in this type of employment within poor, urban environments are often 
mocked, while those who sell crack cocaine make fast money and are given an 
unjustified respect on the streets (Johnson, et al., 1990). Family members who often 
disapprove of the dangerous occupation of selling crack cocaine are also shunned 
by their crack dealing relatives. Disrespect within this type of subculture often
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breaks down the family unit in disadvantaged urban areas. A lack of disrespect is 
also extended to competitors, resulting in a need to respond with violence.
The crack cocaine operations conducted within disadvantaged urban areas are 
often protected through violence. Successful crack dealers are expected to 
demonstrate their wealth and power with flashy cars, lavish parties, and expensive 
clothing. Since the dealers identify themselves through material means, the 
scramble for power, money, and territory is magnified (Johnson, et al., 1990). Large 
scale dealers often reward street-level dealers with sneakers, jewelry, and large 
amounts o f disposable income in order to perpetuate their loyalty and productivity 
within the crack distribution hierarchy.
Crack cocaine distribution also undermines housing and legitimate businesses. 
For example, crack dealers may intimidate business owners and landlords, moving 
from apartment to apartment, building to building, and using otherwise legitimate 
housing for crack cocaine operations. Dealers may create permanent safe houses in 
order to provide a place to distribute and use crack cocaine: apartments, abandoned 
buildings, shooting galleries, after hour clubs, and base houses where the crack is 
actually cooked and packaged for street level distribution (Johnson, et al., 1990). 
Crack cocaine dealers may also deal on the street in front of reputable businesses, 
subsequently driving legitimate consumers and much needed entrepreneurs out of 
America’s inner cities.
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Chapter 11 
Just Desert v. Crime Control
The Commission failed to formulate a sound and well balanced sentencing 
rationale The Commission failed to reconcile the application of just dessert and 
crime control. Just Dessert is based in morality, the culpability of the offender, and 
the harm done to the victim during the commission of the crime. Just dessert 
implies that if  the offender has more culpability, they should receive more 
punishment. Under a just dessert system of criminal sentencing, the offender is 
sentenced for the most recent criminal violation under consideration as well as their 
criminal history. Within a just dessert framework, three other issues are also 
considered at sentencing: (1) the increasing severity of the offender’s violations are 
considered; (2) an apparent lack of respect for the law demonstrated through 
recidivism; and (3) the fact that the offender received ineffective, lenient 
punishment in the past (Morris, 1982). A just dessert sentencing rationale does not 
ordinarily consider extralegal factors into the sentencing process. For example, an 
offender who is married and is the sole provider for his family would not be taken 
into consideration during the sentencing process. Extralegal factors are one of the 
primary sources of controversy swirling around the modified just dessert sentencing 
philosophy and the Guidelines.
Crime control implies that the offender should receive the punishment that 
would most likely prevent future violations of the law. In a perfect world, this could 
be accomplished by deterring others with stiff penalties for crack cocaine violations
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or simply incapacitating the offender in question with a lengthy prison sentence, but 
the sentencing philosophy of incapacitation is the fatal flaw in the just dessert 
sentencing model (Guidelines Manual, 2006, p. 3; Morris, 1982). Imposing harsh 
penalties upon an offender for crack cocaine violations and incapacitating them for 
long periods o f time in prison will not reduce crack cocaine violations committed 
by other offenders. Incapacitation within a just dessert sentencing framework also 
creates a lack o f confidence in the criminal justice system among minority 
populations, increases prison overcrowding, and places an unnecessary strain on 
public expenditures.
The Commission could have resolved issues between the just dessert and the 
crime control sentencing rationales by relying upon the standards of past sentencing 
practices within the federal court system, but the Congress insisted that drug related 
penalties should be formulated in a more strenuous manner based upon the type of 
illegal substance and the quantity of the drug ceased (Guidelines Manual, 2006). 
Those who are left to ponder the opposing principles of just dessert and crime 
control are directed by the Guidelines Manual to apply some kind of vague, 
unspoken local or regional standard, which has resulted in an uneven application of 
federal sentencing rationale all over the United States.
The Guidelines clearly has conflicting goals. The CCCA contained provisions 
that called for punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and the rehabilitation of the 
offender. The Commission believed that the goals of the Congress were to enhance 
the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime through effective and fair 
sentencing (Champion, 1989).
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Just dessert can be easily distinguished from other sentencing rationale. 
Retribution is concerned with the personal suffering of the offender, while just 
dessert places more emphasis upon fairness and balance. The sentencing rationale 
of just dessert consists of two methods of weighing the facts of any particular case 
and coming to a conclusion by balancing these various interests. First, just dessert 
consists of a between-offender balancing operation that requires the judge to 
compare the case being considered with other “similar and dissimilar cases” 
(Austin, 1979, p. 165) and to insure that a graduated system of punishments is 
applied. The between-offender comparison is carried out to insure that similar cases 
are adjudicated in a similar manner and that the punishment fits the crime. Second, 
just dessert consists of a balancing operation carried out to insure that the 
punishment fits the criminal. When attempting to insure that the punishment fits the 
criminal, the judge is attempting to obtain a balance between the amount of harm 
done to the victim and the ultimate penalty that is eventually imposed on the 
offender. When attempting to find the appropriate fit, the judge may exercise her 
discretion by considering extralegal factors. When the judge has insured that the 
punishment fits the crime and the criminal, a presumptive sentence has been 
imposed upon the offender.
Since just dessert is proportionate, it creates respect for the law so that other 
sentencing goals can be accomplished, such as moral disaproval for crack cocaine 
possession, use, and distribution and the affirmation of productive, positive drug 
free principles and values (Austin, 1979). One problem with just dessert is that it 
does not look to the future, but dwells in repairing past wrongs. Just dessert
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sentencing rationale has the future potential to deter crime if applied fairly, but 
sentencing disparity must remain limited. The tempered benefits of just dessert are 
one reason for the implementation of the Guidelines.
Equality is another legal, philosophical concept that is associated with just 
dessert. Equality is the adjudication of like cases in a like manner. The Guidelines 
are a determinate system of criminal sentencing based in just dessert, 
proportionality, and equality. In a determinate system o f sentencing based upon a 
just dessert sentencing rationale, equality is difficult to achieve since it is at odds 
with just dessert (Morris & Tonry, 1990). Once again, the goal of a just dessert 
sentencing system is to determine the harm done to the victim and to place a 
proportionate condign penalty upon the offender according to their culpability in the 
crime committed. When harm to the offender is assessed and applied in a just 
dessert determinate sentencing system, it can only be done in roughly formed 
groups o f offenders according to the sentencing category and the appropriate place 
in the sentencing grid. A determinate sentencing process that is based in just dessert 
violates the concept o f equality and creates undue sentencing disparity. If the 
elements of just dessert, proportionality, and equality present in the Guidelines are 
to function harmoniously, there must be another regulating principle added to the 
federal sentencing landscape that will allow for greater elasticity between these 
legal concepts.
Many critics believe that the Guidelines place too much emphasis on harm rather 
than culpability. Culpability lies at the heart of the just dessert sentencing 
philosophy (Hafer & Allenbaugh, 2003). The sentencing philosophy of just dessert
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asserts that offenders are independent moral agents who actually deserve the 
punishment they receive. Legal scholars and critics believe that the Guidelines 
place too much emphasis on harm rather than placing emphasis on the actual 
knowledge o f the offender and their participation in the crime. Harm based criteria 
is often dramatic and may often be exaggerated. Considering the culpability of an 
offender in any one particular criminal act is a more precise way o f applying the 
appropriate penalty.
The Congress and the Commission made the fundamental mistake of assuming 
that the crime control and just desserts approach to sentencing could be 
accomplished simultaneously. The Congress, through the CCCA, failed to realize 
that crime control and just desserts were incompatible. For example, offender 
characteristics that are relevant to the crime control model of sentencing would 
consist o f prior work record, family relationships, age, and other social 
characteristics (Champion, 1989). A just desserts approach to sentencing is 
designed to simply punish offenders in regards to the seriousness of the crime and 
the harm that was done by committing the offense. Demographic and social 
characteristics have no relationship to the violation of the criminal statute or the 
harm done by the offender during the commission of the crime. The only 
information that is taken into consideration in the just dessert model of sentencing is 
the offense-related information.
Though the ideas of crime control and just deserts are incompatible there may be 
a way to properly consider both rationales simultaneously. Such an approach would 
consist of “all convicted offenders who committed the same type of offense and
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shared similar demographic and social characteristics receiving similar sentences” 
(Champion, 1989, p. 33). In order to create fair and proportionate sentencing, the 
Congress and the Commission would have to consider both legal and individual 
factors simultaneously.
The Guidelines place more emphasis on the just dessert rather than the crime 
control model of sentencing. While the Commission has often played “lip service” 
(Champion, 1989, p. 33) to the crime control model in the form of deterrence and 
incapacitation, their main focus has been on the offense itself, the harm done by the 
offense, and the criminal history of the offender. The Commission has essentially 
placed emphasis on the just dessert approach to sentencing. There is no 
consideration given to demographic or social characteristics that have any proven 
connection to deterrence, incapacitation, or recidivism.
The primary goal o f the Commission is the promulgation of sentences that 
sanction offenders based upon their offense, the harm they have inflicted upon 
others, and their criminal history. The emphasis is placed upon just dessert with no 
consideration for social theory or demographics (Champion, 1989). In order to 
understand the Commission’s responsibilities and the application of the Guidelines, 
it is important to further examine deterrence in light of the theory of just dessert.
Deterrence is often a position espoused by those who maintain a “get tough” 
(Champion, 1989, p.33) approach to crime. Johannes Andenaes (1966) is an expert 
on the issue of deterrence. Deterrence is defined as influencing by fear. Fear 
consists of being apprehended or punished for violations of the law. Andenaes 
believed that there was a basic distinction between the effects of the man being
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punished, known as individual prevention or special prevention, and the effects of 
punishment upon the members of society in general. The elements of special 
prevention are described as deterrence, reformation, and incapacitation. General 
prevention or the effects of punishment upon the members of society may be 
described as “the restraining influences emanating from the criminal law and legal 
machinery” (p. 949). Through the application of the criminal law, messages are sent 
to members of a society. The criminal law gives a detailed list of those unacceptable 
acts that are subject to prosecution and clearly outlines the penalties for these 
particular acts. A legal decision by the courts, and enforcement carried out by 
police and prison officials, emphasize the fact that there is a price to be paid for 
violations of these codes and determines specifically what the potential penalties 
may be in specific cases. When citizens are restrained from taking part in socially 
unacceptable behavior, which they otherwise might have committed, a general 
preventative effect is accomplished.
Essentially, the effects of special prevention are dependent upon the individual 
implementation of the law in each case. General prevention takes place as a result 
o f the law itself and its subsequent enforcement (Andenaes, 1966). In the past, 
executions were used to secure deterrence and insure that law and order was 
maintained in isolated communities. In modem times, deterrence is accomplished 
by emphasizing the threat of any given potential penalty. It is important to take into 
consideration that the criminal law does not operate within a cultural vacuum. The 
function o f the criminal laws varies according to the kind of culture in which they 
serve. A good way of clarifying this point is to compare the criminal law in Europe
and the United States. In a smaller, more slowly changing community, informal 
social norms are strong enough to establish conformity without the presence of 
harsh criminal penalties. In an expanding urbanized society, with accelerated 
mobility, social norms are often weakened and criminal penal codes must be 
implemented and strictly enforced to maintain law and order.
Even in countries that are economically developed, cultural differences may 
exist. For example, criminologist found that the culture in 1930’s America was 
much different than cultural and legal issues that were taking place in Europe at the 
same time. Many of these experts determined that there was a lack o f legal 
conscience in the United States regarding changes in the legislature that affected 
American’s daily life. Social scientists and legal experts determined that penal laws 
had very little influence on public opinions and morals. Americans were not 
influenced by laws that were being produced in the national legislature. The 
American conscience, as it related to the criminal law, was formed through 
association and interaction with family, friends, fellow workers, acquaintances, and 
social clubs (Andenaes, 1966). The problem with securing deterrence in today’s 
modem society is that many people are not motivated to conform to the law through 
the use of abstract threats. Many potential offenders are not moved by threats, but 
only respond to the harsh reality of those who are actually being punished. The 
effect of the criminal law could be seen as nothing more than deterrence.
Three requirements must be met for deterrence to be properly applied. First, the 
punishment must have such an impact that potential offenders will not act in a 
manner that will bring about adverse consequences to them personally. The second
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element of deterrence is the certainty of punishment (Champion, 1989). The lack of 
enforcement would mean that offenders could act according to their own will 
without fear o f reprisal. The swiftness of punishment, known as celerity, is the final 
requirement for deterrence. The punishment must be proximate to the crime. The 
existence of these three factors will bring about deterrence.
It is important to examine the deterrent effects of the Guidelines. In order to 
properly consider the impact of the Guidelines, it is necessary to pose some 
questions in light of the principles of deterrence. For example, to what extent has 
the Guidelines incorporated the three principles of deterrence? How have the 
Guidelines addressed the sentencing philosophies of severity o f punishment, 
certainty of punishment, and celerity?
The Commission failed to give the appropriate weight of the law to factors that 
usually are related to criminal activity and deviant behavior. Chapter 5 part H of the 
Guidelines explicitly states that “age, education and vocational skills, race, sex, 
socioeconomic status, employment, and other demographic factors are not relevant 
in the determination of a sentence or are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines” (Champion, 1989, p. 33). The 
Commission felt that the Guidelines would become too complex and exacting if 
demographic factors were considered. It appears that the Commission considered 
effective guidelines to mean that similar offenses are punished in a similar manner 
rather than acting as a deterrent to future criminal conduct. The Commission’s 
willingness to exclude certain demographic factors such as employment history, 
family relationships, educational achievement, and age are clearly undermining the
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success of ex-offenders who are attempting to remain in good standing on probation 
or parole. These factors are not considered by federal judges on a regular basis. 
Consideration of these kinds of demographic factors only takes place on rare 
occasions when the judge departs from the Guidelines. This kind of departure must 
be documented and fully explained and justified in writing. The Commission has 
clearly placed emphasis on just dessert rather than the deterrence/crime control 
model. The just dessert approach is a much simpler sentencing philosophy to 
implement. The deterrence and crime control model is more difficult to maintain 
because o f the numerous individual factors that must be taken into consideration. 
Since the Commission decided to place emphasis upon just desert, the Guidelines 
are one dimensional. When taking into consideration the principals of just dessert, 
deterrence, and crime control, one philosophy must dominate the other. It appears 
that the Commission has chosen to implement guidelines that place emphasis upon 
inflicting gratuitous pain and suffering upon offenders and draining public finances.
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Chapter 12 
Limiting Retributivism and Just Dessert
Gaining some insight into the theory of limiting retributivism formulated by 
Norval Morris (1993) may shed some light upon the problems that are taking place 
with the just dessert sentencing rationale present in the Guidelines. Modified just 
dessert derives from limiting retributivism. The primary purpose of a modified just 
deserts rationale is to “match the severity o f the punishment to the seriousness of 
the crime” (Hofer, 2006, p. 14). Placing emphasis upon determining the seriousness 
of a crime committed by an offender promotes respect for the law and provides 
adequate punishment for the offense. These are primary goals that are related to 
punishing criminal offenders. Though the Guidelines possess the basic elements of 
limiting retribution, by establishing upper and lower limits of punishment, the 
theory o f limiting retribution has not been developed fully within the Guidelines. 
Implementing the theories of Norval Morris would help the Commission adapt the 
Guidelines to a post -Booker world.
In his article, “Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice,” Professor Richard 
S. Frase (1997), a law professor at the University of Minnesota School of Law, 
discusses Norval Morris’ theory of limited retributivism. Norval Morris (1993), a 
professor at the University of Chicago School of Law, maintains a theory of 
limiting retributivism. Limiting retributivism is a theory of criminal sentencing 
where the concepts of just dessert are used to set upper and lower limits on 
sentencing policy. After establishing this rigid platform to work from, other
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purposes and principles are applied to make this system of determinate sentencing 
more flexible. Some of the other elements surrounding his approach to just dessert 
are crime control, uniformity, and parsimony. In legal terms, parsimony is selecting 
the least severe alternative that will achieve the purposes of the sentence being 
considered by the sentencers. In religious terms, parsimony is referred to as mercy. 
M orris’ theory of limiting retributivism and the flexible elements that surround it 
allow determinate sentencers the opportunity to react to different legal trends and 
issues. He believes that a balance should be established between just dessert and 
equality when sentencing similar criminals. In order to obtain this balance when 
sentencing similar criminals, he insists that the ideas of social protection, 
consideration for scarce public resources, and the minimization of pain and 
suffering inflicted upon the offender should be carefully assessed by the federal 
court system (Morris & Tonry, 1990) Morris’ legal theory of parsimony will insure 
that determinate sentencing systems will weather the storms of political and legal 
trends as they come and go over long periods of time.
Norval Morris (1993) is a realist. He believes that sentencing theory should not 
be just some written collection of esoteric thoughts and concepts. He believes that 
sentencing theory should be directly related to sentencing practice. Morris is 
concerned with the actual day-to-day functioning of the penal system and the 
intergovernmental structure in which it is housed (Frase, 1997). He wants to know 
how judges actually think and act in the courtroom to avoid implementing 
temporary rules that may later be eroded by the opinions of legal scholars and the 
sands o f time.
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Morris (1993) recommends parsimony in the form of compulsory, community 
based drug rehabilitation programs as a fine tuning mechanisms for crack cocaine 
violations and the elements of just dessert, proportionality, and equality present 
within the Guidelines. He proposes a more flexible just dessert approach to criminal 
sentencing. Morris believes that past prison behavior cannot be predicted by in­
prison conduct of the offender. He also believes that programs that are focused 
toward reform within the prison walls are seen as nothing more than coercion and a 
waste o f public resources (Frase, 1997). The prison environment is much too 
restrictive for drug rehabilitation programs to be effective. With this kind of 
community based approach in mind, Morris asserts that compulsory, intermediate 
punishments for drug offenders are crucial to the future success of the Guidelines. 
Compulsory community based drug rehabilitation programs insure that the offender 
stays committed to the program for longer periods of time. The longer offenders 
remain enrolled in the program, the higher the success rate. He insists that closely 
monitored community based treatment programs and structured parole programs 
that are directly related to the nature of the offense is the most effective way to 
decrease prison populations and to make offenders, especially drug offenders, 
productive citizens once again.
Morris (1993) has a limited view toward the application of incapacitation. He 
asserts that it is too difficult to predict which offenders may be dangerous. The 
willingness to attempt to predict future behavior will too often result in the 
government overcompensating and over incarcerating offenders (Frase, 1997).
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Morris (1993) also believes that increased sentences are justified when other 
lesser sanctions have been applied to the same offender previously. Theories such 
as this one could be seen as specific or individual deterrence. He believes that 
specific deterrence may be necessary to get the offender’s attention and that 
sentencing o f this kind may go beyond the required minimum. Although he 
disagrees with individualized predictors of future disruptive and violent behavior, 
he does believe in parole release decisions being based upon actuarial data. He also 
believes that similar increases in sentencing severity may be justified based upon 
mathematical basis for future recidivism.
Morris (1993) asserts that equality in sentencing is not a primary concern, but 
that it should be simply seen as a guiding principle. He believes that equality in 
sentencing is used as a secondary fine tuning mechanism rather than a primary 
sentencing goal (Frase, 1997). He believes that punishment may be unequal, but 
still considered to be just. Morris gives examples of unequal punishment as those 
offenders who turn state’s evidence, those who receive pardon and amnesty, or 
those who benefit from the use of early parole to avoid prison overcrowding.
Finally, Morris (1993) asserts that the least restrictive penalty should be applied 
to each case in order to achieve defined social purposes. Often times, “punishment 
policies are based upon the most villainous of offenders in mind” (Morris & Tonry, 
1990, p. 105). He believes that parsimony represents the least restrictive sanction 
within the realm of sentencing. Morris asserts that parsimony contains elements of 
both utilitarianism and humanism. Jeremy Bentham created the penal philosophy of 
utilitarianism. He believed that punishment itself may be considered evil and it
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should only be applied in instances where it will prevent a greater evil (Frase,
1997). For all intents and purposes, Benthem’s theory of utilitarianism is used, in 
part, to form the theory of limited retributivism. Morris’s theory of parsimony 
combined with the changes made by the Commission in amendment 9 should result 
in a less harmful system o f criminal sentencing that will compensate for past racial 
and ethnic discrimination while mitigating the harsh sentencing rationale of just 
dessert, equality, and proportionality. In addition to promoting fairness, equality, 
and efficiency, the theory of parsimony also promotes the application of mercy in 
criminal sentencing. Although mercy may not be calculated through the use of a 
determinate sentencing grid, mercy may be the element that promotes balance, 
equality, proportionality, and true justice. Legislators and members of the 
Commission, who continue to draft and implement drug legislation based upon just 
dessert, equality, and proportionality, without the fine tuning mechanism of 
parsimony, will continue to find themselves in direct opposition with sentencers 
who feel obligated to circumvent these harsh penalties in search of a better system 
of criminal sentencing. Parsimony in the form of compulsory, community based 
drug rehabilitation programs will punish offenders in a proportionate manner, 
according to the goals of the criminal justice and society.
Morris’ (1993) theory of parsimony through intermediate sanctions appears to be 
a call to return to the old era of rehabilitation, but this is not necessarily true. 
Throughout American history, the federal pendulum of justice has swung from the 
extreme liberal view of rehabilitation to the harsh conservative view of just dessert. 
It is time for the federal criminal justice system to consider intermediate sanctions.
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Introductory Commentary
,e  ain cafe9 ° nes  o f  o ffenses and offenders, the guidelines perm it the court to im pose e ither im prisonm ent o r som e other 
tho n ,CT  ° r  co™b,nat,on sanctions. In determ in ing the type o f sentence to impose, the sentencing jud g e  shou ld  consider 
3  ure.an se riousness o f the conduct, the sta tu to ry purposes o f sentencing, and the pertinen t o ffender characteristics. A 
. nce ls  .In ® gu ide lines i f  it com plies with each applicable section o f th is chapter. The cou rt shou ld  im pose a 
sentence suffic ien t, bu t no t g rea te r than necessary, to com ply with the statutory purposes o f sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Historic a!.Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
PART A - SENTENCING TABLE
T h e  S e n t e n c i n g  T a b l e  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  g u i d e l i n e  r a n g e  f o l l o w s :
Zone
A
Zone
B
Zone
C
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense i II III IV V VI
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) {10, 11, 12) (13 or more)
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 | 1 - 7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3 - 9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4 - 1 0 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 I 1 - 7 4 - 1 0 6-12 | 9 - 1 5
6 0-6 1 - 7 2-8 6-12 9 - 1 5 1 2 - 1 8
7 0-6 2-8 4 - 1 0 8 - 1 4 1 2 - 1 8 1 5 - 2 1
8 0-6 4 - 1 0 6-12 1 0 - 1 6 1 5 - 2 1 1 8 - 2 4
9i 4 - 1 0 6-12 r 8 - 1 4 1 2 - 1 8 1 8 - 2 4 2 1 - 2 7
10 6-12 8 - 1 4 1 0 - 1 6 1 5 - 2 1 2 1 - 2 7 2 4 - 3 0
11 8 - 1 4 10-16 r 1 2 - 1 8 1 8 - 2 4 2 4 - 3 0 2 7 - 3 3
12 1 0 - 1 6 1 2 - 1 8 1 5 - 2 1 2 1 - 2 7 2 7 - 3 3 3 0 - 3 7
13 1 2 - 1 8 1 5 - 2 1 1 8 - 2 4 2 4 - 3 0 3 0 - 3 7 3 3 - 4 1
14 1 5 - 2 1 1 8 - 2 4 2 1 - 2 7 2 7 - 3 3 3 3 - 4 1 3 7 - 4 6
15 1 8 - 2 4 2 1 - 2 7 2 4 - 3 0 3 0 - 3 7 3 7 - 4 6 4 1 - 5 1
16 2 1 - 2 7 2 4 - 3 0 2 7 - 3 3 3 3 - 4 1 4 1 - 5 1 4 6 - 5 7
17 2 4 - 3 0 2 7 - 3 3 3 0 - 3 7 3 7 - 4 6 4 6 - 5 7 5 1 - 6 3
18 2 7 - 3 3 3 0 - 3 7 3 3 - 4 1 4 1 - 5 1 5 1 - 6 3 5 7 - 7 1
19 3 0 - 3 7 3 3 - 4 1 3 7 - 4 6 4 6 - 5 7 5 7 - 7 1 6 3 - 7 8
20 3 3 - 4 1 3 7 - 4 6 4 1 - 5 1 5 1 - 6 3 6 3 - 7 8 7 0 - 8 7
21 3 7 - 4 6 4 1 - 5 1 4 6 - 5 7 5 7 - 7 1 7 0 - 8 7 7 7 - 9 6
22 4 1 - 5 1 4 6 - 5 7 5 1 - 6 3 6 3 - 7 8 7 7 - 9 6 8 4 - 1 0 5
23 4 6 - 5 7 5 1 - 6 3 5 7 - 7 1 7 0 - 8 7 8 4 - 1 0 5 9 2 - 1 1 5
24 5 1 - 6 3 5 7 - 7 1 6 3 - 7 8 7 7 - 9 6 9 2 - 1 1 5 1 0 0 - 1 2 5
25 5 7 - 7 1 6 3 - 7 8 7 0 - 8 7 8 4 - 1 0 5 1 0 0 - 1 2 5 1 1 0 - 1 3 7
26 6 3 - 7 8 7 0 - 8 7 7 8 - 9 7 9 2 - 1 1 5 1 1 0 - 1 3 7 1 2 0 - 1 5 0
27 7 0 - 8 7 7 8 - 9 7 8 7 - 1 0 8 1 0 0 - 1 2 5 1 2 0 - 1 5 0 1 3 0 - 1 6 2
28 7 8 - 9 7 8 7 - 1 0 8 9 7 - 1 2 1 1 1 0 - 1 3 7 1 3 0 - 1 6 2 1 4 0 - 1 7 5
29 8 7 - 1 0 8 9 7 - 1 2 1 1 0 8 - 1 3 5 1 2 1 - 1 5 1 1 4 0 - 1 7 5 1 5 1 - 1 8 8
30 9 7 - 1 2 1 1 0 8 - 1 3 5 1 2 1 - 1 5 1 1 3 5 - 1 6 8 1 5 1 - 1 8 8 1 6 8 - 2 1 0
31 1 0 8 - 1 3 5 1 2 1 - 1 5 1 1 3 5 - 1 6 8 1 5 1 - 1 8 8 1 6 8 - 2 1 0 1 8 8 - 2 3 5
32 1 2 1 - 1 5 1 1 3 5 - 1 6 8 1 5 1 - 1 8 8 1 6 8 - 2 1 0 1 8 8 - 2 3 5 2 1 0 - 2 6 2
33 1 3 5 - 1 6 8 1 5 1 - 1 8 8 1 6 8 - 2 1 0 1 8 8 - 2 3 5 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 2 3 5 - 2 9 3
34 1 5 1 - 1 8 8 1 6 8 - 2 1 0 1 8 8 - 2 3 5 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 2 3 5 - 2 9 3 2 6 2 - 3 2 7
35 1 6 8 - 2 1 0 1 8 8 - 2 3 5 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 2 3 5 - 2 9 3 2 6 2 - 3 2 7 2 9 2 - 3 6 5
36 1 8 8 - 2 3 5 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 2 3 5 - 2 9 3 2 6 2 - 3 2 7 2 9 2 - 3 6 5 3 2 4 - 4 0 5
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37 2 1 0 - 2 6 2 2 3 5 - 2 9 3 2 6 2 - 3 2 7 2 9 2 - 3 6 5 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 3 6 0 - l i f e
38 2 3 5 - 2 9 3 2 6 2 - 3 2 7 2 9 2 - 3 6 5 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e
39 2 6 2 - 3 2 7 2 9 2 - 3 6 5 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e
40 2 9 2 - 3 6 5 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e
41 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e
42 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e 3 6 0 - l i f e
43 life life life life life life
Commentary to Sentencing Table
A pp lica tion  No tes :
1. The O ffense Leve l (1-43) fo rm s the vertica l axis o f the Sentencing Table. The Crim inal H istory Category (I- 
VI) fo rm s the ho rizon ta l axis o f the Table. The in tersection o f the O ffense Leve l and  Crim inal H istory Category  
d isp lays the G uideline Range in m onths o f im prisonm ent. "Life" m eans life im prisonm ent. For example, the 
gu ide line  range  applicable to a defendant with an Offense Level o f 15 and  a Crim inal H istory C ategory o f  III is 
24-30  m onths o f  im prisonm ent.
2. In rare  cases, a to ta l o ffense leve l o f less  than 1 o r m ore than 43 m ay resu lt from application o f  the 
guidelines. A to ta l o ffense leve l o f less than 1 is  to be trea ted  as an offense leve l o f 1. An offense leve l o f more  
than 43 is  to be trea ted  as an offense leve l o f  43.
3. The C rim ina l H is to ry  C ategory is  de term ined by the total c rim ina l h is to ry po in ts  from C hapter Four, Part A, 
excep t as p rov ided  in § § 4 B 1 .1 (C areer O ffender) and  4B1.4 (A rm ed C areer Criminal). The total crim inal 
h is to ry  po in ts  assoc ia ted  with each C rim ina l H is to ry Category are shown under each Crim inal H istory  
C ategory in the S entencing Table.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987, Amended effective November 1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 270); November 1, 1991 (see 
Appendix C, amendment 418); November 1, 1992 (see Appendix C, amendment 462).
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